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ii. 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis deals with some of the implications of 
colonial development policies involving the use of grants-
in-aid. Although concern with economic development by 
colonial governments is nothing new, concerted efforts to 
promote development through public investment programs is 
largely a post-World War II phenomenon. The interest of 
certain governments in the economic development of their 
colonies can be seen in Africa, where public investment pro-
grams have been initiated in nearly every country since the 
end of the war. Finance for these programs has come from 
various sources, among them grants-in-aid. 
The importance of grants as a source of development 
finance has varied in the Belgian, French and British African 
colonies. In the Belgian Congo, programs have been financed 
almost entirely out of local resources. In the French colo-
nies, reliance upon metropolitan grants-in-aid has been so 
heavy as to cause, at times, a severe drain upon the French 
economy. In British dependencies, metropolitan grant funds 
have been used for development purposes since 1945, though to 
an appreciably smaller extent than in French territories. 
Official British statements claiming that these grants 
have resulted in sacrifices for the United Kingdom coincide 
with what one would normally eXPect in the case of grants-in-
aid. It is to be noted, however, that certain United Kingdom 
iii. 
colonies, particularly those in West Africa, held substantial 
financial assets during the whole period in which they re-
ceived British grants. In light of this and certain other 
facts that will be presented later, the question arises 
whether the grants-in-aid to West African countries have, in 
fact, involved sacrifices for the United Kingdom. 
The question centers around the position of the four 
West African countries (Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra 
Leone) as members of the sterling area and the role of United 
Kingdom grants in West African development programs. For the 
sake of clarity it has been deemed advisable to preceed the 
analysis with an examination of certain characteristics of 
the sterling area in relation to West Africa and the latter~s 
public investment programs. In Chapter I, therefore, the' 
discussion is limited to the structure of the sterling area 
as it affects West Africa. In Chapter II, West African de-
velopment programs are described with special reference to 
United Kingdom grants-in-aid as a source of development 
finance. In Chapter III, the main problem arising from the 
facts presented earlier is analysed. 
The problem is significant in view of recent changes 
in Britain's economic policy toward its dependencies. Before 
iv. 
World War II, United Kingdom policy statements repeatedly 
emphasized that British colonies should finance development 
on a pay-as-you-go basis. Though some loans and grants were 
made, on the whole no substantial money was given in this 
form. There appeared to be a significant change in this 
aspect of British policy, however, when the first Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act was passed in 1940. The United 
Kingdom thus declared its intention to provide substantial 
grants in support of development programs in its colonies. 
It is hoped that an analysis of the question of whether or 
not the grants have resulted in sacrifices for the United 
Kingdom, as has been claimed, will show whether the change 
in British policy was substantive or merely formal. Whether, 
that is, public investment programs in West Africa have in 
fact been assisted by the United Kingdom or whether they have 
been financed entirely on the basis of local output. 
1. 
I. THE STERLING AREA IN RELATION TO WEST AFRICA 
Abandonment of the Gold Standard 
The historical roots of the sterling area are deeply en-
meshed in the soil of the international trade of the British 
Commonwealth. The size of British trade in world markets 
established London's importance as a financial market during 
the 19th century. Sterling was considered "in some respects 
an equal, or even superior, partner" to gold under the gold 
standard. 1 Tew points out that countries trading with 
Great Britain found it convenient to trade in sterling and 
maintain balances in London. Moreover, by virtue of the rela-
tive stability of British prices and the knowledge that ster-
ling could be converted into gold at the Bank of England on 
demand, it was considered a safe currency; the financial 
bonds of the world to London were thus strengthened. 
With the breakdown of the gold standard in the early 
1930 1s, many of the trading nations of the world chose to 
define their currencies in terms of sterling or dollars owing 
to the convertibility and transferability of both currencies. 
• 
2 . 
Those countries that chose sterling came to be known as the 
"sterling area" countries. By 1933 this included all of the 
British Commonwealth (except Canada and Newfoundland), most 
of the Scandinavian and Baltic countries and several others. 
From 1931 to 1939 the sterling area existed without formal 
definition. It is useful to examine the structure of the 
area during that period in order to see the significance of 
the changes that took place from 1939 onward. 
In many respects the system from 1931 to 1939 remained 
as it had been under the gold standard. Countries still 
traded with Britain in sterling, and still maintained balances 
in London; these were sterling rather than gold. Members 
defined their currencies in terms of sterling at voluntarily 
fixed exchange rates. This was due in part to the dependence 
of members on British trade. 
• • • these countries had a strong interest in 
protecting the prices of their exports and safe-
guarding their competitive position on the British 
market by allowing their c~rrencies to depreciate 
in company with the pound. 
2League of Nations, International Currency Experience, 
1944, p. 48. 
3. 
Sterling balances were freely convertible into gold and 
foreign currencies, as they had been under the gold standard. 
The British, however, did not commit themselves to 
maintaining a fixed rate of exchange between sterling and gold 
as was the case under the gold standard. Instead, they 
attempted to keep the existing rate stable by "ironing out" 
short-term fluctuations. This was done through the operations 
of the Exchange Equalization Account. 3 
Perhaps the most significant feature of the pre-World War 
II sterling area was that it was "a club in which custom and 
habit took the place of rules."4 There were no sanctions 
leveled against violators of the financial etiquette. Each 
country, in carrying out its international financial policies 
was guided by the level of its own reserves.5 
In 1939 the sterling area underwent three major changes.6 
First, all non-Commonwealth members dropped out, with the 
3Tew, op. cit., p. 26. The account bought and sold ster-
ling on the market when supply and demand pressures threatened 
to cause a change in the exchange rate of sterling. This 
point will be discussed in greater detail later. See 
4 A.R. Conan, The Sterling Area, London: Macmillan & Co., 
1952, p. 148 
5For information concerning the sterling area before 1939 
see: League of Nations, op. cit., pp. 48-64; Tew, op. cit., 
pp. 120-~4; P.W. Bell, The Sterling Area in the Postwar World, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956, pp. 3-18; E. Zupnick, "The 
Sterling Area's Central Pooling System, Re-e.xamined, 11 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. LXIX, 1955, pp. 72-73; Sir D.H. 
Robertson~_ Britain and the World Economy, London: Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., 1954, pp. 32-38. 
6
zupnick, op. cit., pp. 72-73. 
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exception of Egypt, the Sudan, Iraq, Ice~and, and the Faroe 
Islands. Second, the area received formal definition with 
the establishment o1· an exchange control system. These 
regu~ations, drawn up by the members o1' the ster~ing area, were 
aimed at effecting maximum transferability or sterling within 
the sterling area and complete control over transactions with 
the rest o1' the world. 7 Third, the primary aim o1· the area 
became the gathering and conserving ot· 1'inancial and economic 
resources. This was attempted in three ways: {i) unauthor-
ized capita~ movements were 1'orbidden; {2) memoers agreed 
to accumu~ate sterling balances in London when possible, 
rather than to spend them;~ and L::S) a go~d and 1'oreign currency 
pool was established. While purchases of gold were suspended 
at the beginning of the war, members still had the right to 
9 purchase foreign currencies. They "agreed to limit their 
purchases of foreign exchange to what they needed for the 
settlement of essential external payments."lO Thus, in 1939 
the sterling area was converted "from a loose association of 
1Be11, op. cit., pp. 44-45. 
eThe United Kingdom paid for its trade deficits with 
sterling *rea countries by adding to their sterling balances. 
S. Katz, 'Leads and Lags in Sterling Payments," Reyiew of 
Economics and Statistics, V~ XXXV, 1953, p. 82. 
9Great Britain, Committee on the Working of the Monetary 
System Report, Cmnd. 827, 1959, p. 238. 
lOibid. 
5. 
nations into a grouping with a formal structure of administra-
tive regulations as well as some unwritten conventions."ll 
The most significant feature of the sterling area in the 
postwar period was that it was an association based on mutual 
advantage, rather than being a monetary association based on 
loose agreement. This may be attributed to two things. 
First, by the end of the war the member nations had accumulated 
sizeable sterling balances. Balances increased from £ 300 
million in 1939 to£ 2,500 million in 1945. 12 The British 
economy had been severely drained during the war and the 
financial means to meet its sterling obligations were not 
within its reach. Furthermore, it was possible for members to 
trade with each other without producing the actual currency 
with which to carry on that trade. Deficits were merely 
debited to one sterling account in London and credited to 
the other. 
Second, the sterling area, like most of the non-sterling 
world, experienced a severe dollar shortage. 13 The wartime 
phenomenon of pooling foreign currencies and gold became even 
more attractive in light of this shortage. Each member had 
llKatz, op. cit., p. 81. 
l2Robertson, op. cit., p. 38. No source cited. 
13For a description of the nature of the dollar problem 
see: K.Wright, "Dollar Pooling in the Sterling Area," American 
Economic Review, Vol. XLIV, 1952, pp. 564-566. 
b. 
the prospect of obtaining scarce dollars in order to finance 
imports in excess of its exports to countries outside the 
sterling area merely by selling some of the sterling accumulated 
in its sterling account in London. A country such as Australia, 
for example, could buy dollars from London's pool with sterling 
it held in its London balances. This could occur even if 
Australia was in deficit with the whole world. It meant that 
foreign exchange did not have to be earned to pay for deficits 
as long as a country held sterling balances. At the same time, 
members had to turn in their foreign exchange and had no right 
to claim it merely because they earned it. For these reasons, 
while independent members were free to withdraw from the 
sterling area, continued participation in the area was a great 
financial advantage. 
From these changes in the advantages and obligations of 
sterling area membership came the need for formal definition 
of the rules of the game. Who were the members and what were 
their obligations and privileges? The British Exchange 
Control Act of 1947 provided the answers. 14 Members were 
defined as those countries which came under the classification 
of "Scheduled Territories." However, the sterling area was 
understood to be more than a list of scheduled territories. 
14areat Britain, Cmnd. 827, op. cit. 
It is essentially a group or countries, most but 
not all or them members or the Commonwealth, who 
follow generally comparable policies in their 
overseas transactions, in particular pegging the 
rate or their currency on sterling and holding 
the bulk or their reserves in sterling.l5 
The act allowed freedom or payment to countries within the 
sterling area. Payments to outside nations, on the other 
hand, required permission of the Treasury. Consequently, 
there was to be no exportation or legal tender.l6 
7. 
It was this type or close relationship and agreement 
between the other members and the United Kingdom that enabled 
the latter to protect itself against the possibility or rapid 
decumulation or the large sterling balances. Agreements to 
limit the rate at which sterling balances would be drawn upon 
were made with India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Iraq, Burma, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Argentine, Brazil, Egypt, 
Israel, Italy, Jordan, Uruguay, and the Irish Republic.l7 
Australia and New Zealand were the only Dominion countries 
that "enjoyed full convertibility throughout the postwar 
period."l8 Constraints on depleting balances in these agree-
15British Information Services, "Sterling and the Sterling 
Area," British Affairs, Vol. III, No. 4, 1959, p. 203. 
16H.A. Shanon, "The British Payments and Exchange Control 
System," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXIII, 1949, p. 216. 
17shanon, op. cit., pp. 219-220; Zupnick, op. cit., p. 74; 
F.V. Meyer, Britain, The Sterling Area and Europe, Cambridge: 
Bowes and Bowes, 1952, p. 49. 
18zupnick, op. cit., p. 74. 
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ments limited the use of pre-war and war-time earnings. 
Current earnings were not restricted.l9 The restricted accounts 
became known as blocked accounts. The blocking of balances, 
coupled with the agreement among members to purchase as large 
a percentage of total imports as was possible from within the 
sterling area, constituted a major change in the area as it 
had been understood in the pre-war period. 
To tell creditors that these sterling balances could 
only be used for the purchase of goods from the sterling 
area, or, in certain cases and subject to the changing 
directives of British authorities, to purchase goods 
in other specified countries ••• was to make a most 
drastic change in what had historically b~0n understood as the very nature of a sterling deposit. 
By 1959 the stringency of the sterling area•s restrictions 
was lessened considerably. The International Monetary Fund 1 s 
annual report on exchange restrictions points out that transfer 
to non-resident accounts is now permissible in the sterling 
area. That is, sterling balances may be used to purchase 
goods from countries outside the area. Residents in sterling 
area countries may purchase goods from those nations that are 
willing to accept sterling as payment. Moreover, since 
sterling is now freely convertible at market rates, purchases 
that require foreign currencies are also allowed. There still 
19Bell, op. cit., p. 20. 
20R.C. Harrod, "The Pound Sterling," Essats in International 
Finance, No. 13, Princeton: University Press,952, p. 12. 
9. 
remains, however, a list of restrictions. 21 Imports require 
licenses, invisible imports must be cleared with the exchange 
authorities, foreign currency earned in exporting must be 
turned in, and capital payments outside the sterling area 
require approval, "which normally is granted for commercial 
investment that promises to employ sterling area skills or 
techniques or to assist sterling area exports or the production 
22 
of raw materials." These restrictions, while less stringent 
than they have been since the end of the war, describe some-
thing far less than free convertibility. 
The Exchange Equalization Account 
The central mechanism of the sterling area since the 
advent of World War II has been the central pool of gold and 
foreign currencies, the Exchange Equalization Account. It is 
the sources of foreign exchange for all members and the 
account in which foreign currencies earned by them are deposited. 
The Exchange Equalization Account was set up by the 
Finance Act of 1932 to provide a fund which could 
be used, under the control of the Treasury for the 
purchase and sale of gold and foreign currencies in 
order to prevent excessive fluctuations from day to 
day in the exchange value of sterling.23 
21International Monetary Fund, Tenth Annual Re4ort, Exchange 
Restrictions, Washington: I.M.F., 1959, p. 4, pp. 1 0-42. 317-325. 
22Ibid., p. 321. 
23areat Britainr Cmnd. 827, op. cit., p. 111. 
10. 
The Account was given an initial stock of sterling by the 
Exchequer in order to begin operations.24 This sterling was 
to be used for buying enough foreign currency to maintain a 
stable rate when demand pressures on sterling threatened to 
drive the rate up, and for selling gold and foreign currency 
in the market when the supply of sterling was large enough to 
drive the rate down. 
The United Kingdom had three objectives in creating the 
Account in the prewar period: (1) to prevent only those exchange 
rate fluctuations that were either seasonal in nature or due 
to speculative capital movements (since it was still interested 
in maintaining "flexibility in relation to long-run disequi-
libria,"25), such as major disturbances in balance of payments 
on current account;26 (2) to demonstrate that the government 
and not the central bank was in direct control of the inter-
national monetary position; 27 and (3) to insulate the British 
2~ew, op. cit., p. 26. 
2~arrod, op. cit., p. 7. Since the end of World War II 
Britain has agreed to peg the exchange rate of the pound through 
its membership in the International Monetary Fund. On this 
point, see: Great Britain, Cmnd. 827, op. cit., p. 112. 
26To be effective, the operations of the Account must be 
secret. League of Nations, op. cit., p. 157; Great Britain, 
Cmnd. 827, op. cit., p. 125. 
27A.C.L. Day, Outline of Monetari Economics, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1957, p. 443. Tfiiss no longer necessary 
since the nationalization of the Bank of England in 1946. 
11. 
economy against the adverse a~~ects o~ in~lows and out~lows 
o~ gold resulting ~rom ~oreign trade surpluses and de~icits 
which were common under the gold standard. When gold and 
~oreign exchange were purchased ~rom the Account by the public, 
the Account would purchase bills ~rom the Exchequer, which in 
turn would correspondingly decrease the Treasury's borrowing 
~rom the banks and the public. Conversely, sales o~ gold and 
~oreign exchange to the Account resulted in a decrease in the 
Account's lending to the Exchequer, which would then increase 
its borrowing ~rom the banks and the public. It was hoped 
that through these monetary manipulations, the multiple ex-
pansions and contractions o~ the credit system that would 
ordinarily occur i~ these ~unds were to ~low through the 
banking system would be avoided.28 
The threat o~ war in 1939 did not change the structure o~ 
the ~oreign exchange pool; it merely caused members to restrict 
their calls on these assets. As has been noted, restrictions 
were not ~ormal. By virtue o~ the advantages they experienced, 
members agreed to play the rules. This "gentlemen's agreement" 
has been the ~oundation o~ the sterling area's success. 29 
28M.W. Dacey, The British Banking Mechanism, London: 
Gainsborough Press, 1951, pp. 103-104. 
29Bell, op. cit., p. 52. 
12. 
Beginning in 1939, foreign exchange dealings were conducted 
through official exchange dealers; from the early 1830 1 s they 
had been handled by the banks.3° 
This function of the Account was made official in 1946, 
when the Finance Act declared that one of the purposes of the 
Account was "the conservation or disposition in the national 
interest of the means of making payments abroad."31 A year 
later, the Exchange Control Act of 1947 extended the control 
system by specifying that exchange could be obtained only 
through authorized dealers.32 All gold and foreign currency 
received was to be turned in to the Exchange Equalization 
Account. 33 
The main purpose of the Act was to feed into the Account, 
which had officially taken over the operation of the gold and 
foreign currency pool, "all available gold and foreign exchange 
and to regulate the outflow from that central fund."34 The 
Account then regulated the flow of these funds to the public 
through authorized dealers who were responsible to the Bank 
of England and the Treasury for their actions. In each of the 
member countries requests for gold and foreign exchange were 
channeled through similar exchange authorities, and if approved 
were carried out by a bank representative in London working 
30rbid., p. 347. 
31areat Britain, Cmnd. 827, op. cit., p. 11. 
32rbid., p. 112. 33shanon, op. cit., p. 214. 
34rbid. 
13. 
through exchange dealers. Each member had the right to draw 
from the Account whether it was a net contributor or not. 
Inasmuch as convertibility was technically maintained through-
out this period, it was necessary for member nations to con-
trol their requests for foreign exchange if the pool was not 
to be dangerously depleted. 
In order to limit foreign exchange requirements, several 
restrictions were set up against the outside world, such as 
restraints on dealings in foreign exchange and gold, and limita-
tions on capital movements, both of which have already been 
mentioned, as well as direct controls of imports and exports.35 
The latter took the form of licenses, quotas and tariffs. 
These restrictions were instituted throughout the sterling area 
and not only in the United Kingdom. 
These controls have not been exercised by the United 
Kingdom in isolation but have been reinforced by 
parallel controls in other parts of the sterling 
area, operated independently of but in frequent 
consultation with the United Kingdom authorities.36 
Even though full convertibility has existed since December 
1958, the central reserves of the sterling area are still 
managed and controlled through the Account. If there is any 
indication that these reserves are being seriously depleted, it 
would not be necessary to create machinery to correct the 
35areat Britain, Cmnd. 827, op. cit., p. 260. 
36Ibid. 
14. 
situation, since the Exchange Account is already equipped to 
do so. 
West African Sterling Balances 
Sterling balances held by West African members, like 
those of other members of the sterling area, in part represent 
assets which theoretically could be used for expenditures on 
economic development. Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana (the former 
Gold Coast) and Nigeria have, as a group, consistently been 
the largest holders of colonial sterling balances since 1945.37 
As colonies, these countries have had neither the right 
to determine their own international monetary policies nor the 
option to withdraw from the area.38 The colonies were "under 
more or less direct control from London as to their dispurse-
ments and receipts."39 It was not therefore necessary for 
the United Kingdom to make blocking agreements with its colo-
nies. At the same time, as members of the sterling area, the 
colonies pursued policies that were in harmony with the over-
all aims of the sterling area: they favored sterling area pr~ 
ducts and discriminated against non-area countries. 
37Economic Cooperation Administration, The Sterling Area: 
An American Analysis, London: E.C.A., 1951, p. 195; Great 
Britain, Digest of Colonial Statistics,No 13, London: 1954, 
and Digest of Colonial Statistics, No. 44, London: 1960. 
38Ghana has been an independent member since 1957; 
Nigeria will gain its independence Oct. 1, 1960, and Sierra 
Leone will become independent in 1961. 
39shanon, op. cit., p. 218. 
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Given these special considerations of political status, 
let us examine West African sterling balances in relation to 
the sterling area as a whole. 
Sterling balances of area members, including those of 
West African colonies, represent "net liabilities of bankers 
in the United Kingdom to their overseas offices and other 
account holders, including funds held as cover for overseas 
currencies, and certain liabilities of His Majesty's Govern-
ment expressed in sterling or sterling area currencies."40 
The sterling balances of sterling area members increased from 
£ 300 million in 1939 to£ 2,500 million in 1945. 41 This 
total increased to a postwar high of £ 3,053 million in 1953 
and fell to a low of£ 2,297 million in 1947.42 The latest 
figure is for 1958 and shows the total sterling area member 
balances to be £2,618 million.43 Inasmuch as a large part 
of the total trade of the sterling area is carried on within 
the area it is not surprising that the accumulated balances, 
which seemed so large at the end of the war, have altered so 
little in the past fifteen years. While independent members 
40shanon, "The Sterling Balances of the Sterling Area," 
Economic Journal, Vol. LX, 1950, p. 532. 
41Robertson, op. cit., p. 38. 
42Great Britaint United Kingdom Balance of Payments 1946-
1953, Cmd. 7520, 195~; United Kingdom Balance of Payments 
1955-1958, Cmnd. 540, 1959, p. 14. 
43rbid. 
16. 
have decreased their sterling balances from £ 2,008 million 
in 1945 to £ 1,575 million in 1956, the colonies have in-
creased theirs from £ 454 million in 1945 to £ 1,013 million 
in 1959. 44 The role of the West African dependencies can be 
seen in Table 1. 
In the five year period from 1945-1950 West Africa's 
share of colonial sterling assets increased ten per cent; in 
the following five years it rose another 13.7 per cent. At 
the same time West Africa's share of total sterling area 
assets rose from four per cent in 1945 to 16.7 per cent in 
1955. By 1957 West African balances were 39.5 per cent of 
colonial assets and 17.2 per cent of total sterling area hold-
ings. This situation seems to indicate that the monetary 
policies of an independent member of the sterling area are 
different from those of colonial members who have their 
policies determined in London. This is evidenced by two facts: 
first, independent member balances were drawn down steadily in 
the postwar period; second, West African sterling balances 
account for such a high percentage of the total sterling assets 
of the area. 
It seems strange that an underdeveloped area such as West 
Africa should be the holder of such large monetary assets. 
44Ibid. 
17. 
TABLE 1 
WEST AFRICAN STERLING ASSETS 
£ Millions 
Total Total W.A. as per- W.A. Assets as 
Year Colonial West Africa cent of total percent of total 
Colonial Sterling Area 
1945 454 91 20.0 4.0 
1950 852 256 30.0 9.0 
1951 1,090 333 30.0 11.0 
1952 1,222 362 29.6 13.0 
1953 1,245 400 32.0 13.0 
1954 1,343 462 34.0 9.8 
1955a 1,161 507 43.7 16.7 
1956a 1,179 499 42.2 17.4 
1957a 1,172 463 39-5 17.2 
1958b 1,003 278 27.7 10.6 
Sources: Great Britain, United Kingdom Balance of Pay-
ments 1946-1953, Cmd. 7520, 1954, p. 56; United Kingdom 
Balance of Payments 195f-1928, Cmnd. 540, 1959, p. 14; 
Digest of Colonial Stat sties, No. 13, 1954, p. 85, and 
No. 44, 1960, p. 62; Ghana, Economic Survey 1957, Accra: 
1958, p. 38. 
aAfter 1954 Ghana was dropped out of the Colonial 
statistics but is included here. 
bFigures for Ghana not available for this year. 
These assets may theoretically be used to finance trade defi-
cits. It will be shown later that in no year since the end 
of World War II have West African countries been significant 
users of foreign exchange, particularly of dollars. Further-
more, the increases in their sterling balances indicate that 
they have not used them to finance deficits with the rest of 
the sterling area. Thus, the rather paradoxical phenomenon 
of sizeable capital accumulation by an underdeveloped area 
remaining, as far as this area is concerned, in paper form. 
Not all the sterling assets of West Africa may be considered 
to be available for development expenditures, however. This 
can be more clearly understood by examining the composition 
of West African sterling balances. 
Inasmuch as data on the composition of sterling assets 
of Gambia and Sierra Leone are not available, only figures 
for Nigeria and Ghana will be cited. These two countries 
accounted for 95, 93, and 94 per cent of West African sterling 
assets in the years 1954, 1955, and 195645 so the omission of 
data for Gambia and Sierra Leone does not pose a serious 
problem for present purposes. Tables 2 and 3 show the compo-
sition of sterling assets and the average per cent that each 
item is of the total assets of the specific country. These 
items need some explanation. 
45Great Britain, Overseas Economic Surve s, Ni eria, 
London: Her Majesty's S a onery f ce, , p. ; Great 
Britain, Di~est of Colonial Statistics, No. 13, London: 1954, 
p. 55; Grea Britain, Digest of Colonial Statistics, No. 44, 
London: 19b0, p. b2. 
19. 
TABLE 2 
COMPOSITION OF STERLING ASSETS, NIGERIA 
£ Millions 
Held by 1954 1955 1956 1957 Average % 
of Total 
Marketing Boards 61 74 67 32 24 
Currency Board 66 54 58 70 26 
Federal Gov't 63 52 54 51 23 
Regional Gov't 8 23 27 31 10 
Native Authorities 3 3 3 4 1 
Regional Production 
and Development 
Boards 13 13 10 6 4 
Other semi-official 15 20 14 7 6 
Net balances of 
Banks Abroad 16 24 22 11 6 
TOTAL 245 263 255 212 100 
Sources: Nigeria~ Economic Survey 1959, Lagos: 1959, 
pp. 98-99; Great Britain~ Overseas Economic Survey, Nigeria, 
op. cit. 
TABLE 3 
COMPOSITION OF STERLING ASSETS, GHANA 
Held by 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Central Government 19 30 35 39 76 84 79 
Other Institutions & 
Currency Board 32 35 37 36 37 38 41 
Banks 4 3 7 10 11 14 12 
Other Public Authorities 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 
Cocoa Marketing Board 52 63 61 66 66 63 52 
Other Government 
Enterprises 3 3 4 7 4 5 5 
- - - - - - -
TOTAL 112 135 145 159 195 207 192 
Source: Ghana, Economic Survey 1957, Accra: 1958, pp. 38-39. 
1957 
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a. The West Arrican Marketing Boards had their beginnings 
in 1947 with the establishment of cocoa marketing boards in 
the Gold Coast and Nigeria. More boards were established in 
1949. 46 
Most of the area's exports of agricultural products 
are handled by statutory marketing boards and financed 
through London; ••• Prices are fixed in advance for the 
whole season's crop in order to prevent speculation. 
The boards retain part of their receipts from the sale 
of (their goods) in goon7years to cushion the effect of a cyclical downturn. 
Marketing Board holdings of sterling in London are 24 per 
cent of total Nigerian sterling assets and 37 per cent of 
Ghana's. It has been the practice of the marketing boards 
in West Africa, as will be shown in greater detail in Chapter 
II, to make sizeable grants and loans to the governments in 
order to aid in development financing. A certain percentage 
of marketing board holdings must be liquid in order to be 
readily available for possible market fluctuations. Just 
what this percentage is considered to be, or should be, is 
not known. It is clear, however, that these funds are avail-
able, in part, for development financing either in the form 
of grants or loans, and may, at the discretion of the market-
ing boards, be used for that purpose. It hasalready been 
noted that the majority of development expenditures in West 
46Economic Cooperation Administration, op. cit. 
47Ibid. 
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Africa are undertaken by public authorities. It can be seen, 
therefore, that as revenues accruing to marketing boards in-
crease, the funds available for development expenditures in-
crease also. This is accomplished without increasing taxation. 
That is, increased marketing board allocations for development 
will not lower consumption or investment. This is not the 
case for currency board holdings. 
b. Currency Board holdings represent about 26 and 22 
per cent of the total sterling assets of Nigeria and Ghana 
respectively. The West African Currency Board was established 
in 1912; its regulations of 1949 state that: 
The Board shall issue at its main centres ••• to 
any person who makes demand in that behalf coin 
or currency notes equivalent to the value ••• of 48 sums in sterling lodged with the Board in London. 
Currency is issued when sterling is brought to the Board. In 
order to secure sterling, individuals must bring West African 
currency to banks where it is exchanged for sterling. The 
banks may obtain this from their own sterling balances in 
London or they may present the currency to the Board for 
sterling. The rate of exchange between West African currency 
and sterling is fixed by the agreements of the sterling area.49 
48w.T. Newlyn and D.C. Rowan, Mone~ and Bankin~ in 
British Colonial Africa, Oxford: Claren on Press, 1 54, pp. 46-47. 
49areat Britain, Memorandum on the Sterling Assets of 
the British Colonies, Cmnd. 298, 1953, p. 1. 
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The Board accumulates sterling at least to the extent that it 
issues local currency.50 As of July 1, 1959, Nigeria and 
Ghana established their own currency and began to withdraw 
from circulation the tender of the West African Currency 
Board.51 
This means that Nigeria and Ghana will now have funds 
available for development financing which could not be used 
under the West African Currency Board system. To be sure, 
Nigeria must continue to hold 60 per cent of its currency 
issues and 35 per cent of its demand liabilities in the form 
of sterling assets for the first five years of the new system,52 
but the remaining 40per cent may be borrowed by the govern-
ment. This movement to a partial reserve system will have 
the effect of creating a base for the expansion of credit in 
the Ghanaian and Nigerian economies, which will further open 
the possibilities for government borrowing. The sterling 
\ assets of the West African Currency Board will decrease 
accordingly as its currency is turned-in by Ghana and Nigeria. 
Until this time, however, it should be noted that the regu-
lations of the Currency Board did not allow the sterling 
50rbid. 
5lrnternational Monetary Fund, op. cit., p. 140; Nigeria, 
Economic Survey 1959, op. cit., p. 99. 
52Nigeria, Economic Survey 1959, op. cit. 
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assets of the Board to be used for development purposes.53 
West African currency could be secured for development by 
West African governments through local taxation and either 
spent directly in West Africa or exchanged for sterling and 
then spent outside West Africa. 
c. Federal Government holdings of sterling account for 
23 per cent of the total in Nigeria and 32 per cent in Ghana. 
In 1959 it was estimated that 17.5 million of the Nigerian 
figure represented funds earmarked for various sinking and 
pension funds. This accounted for about 8 per cent of the 24 
per cent held by the Federal government in that year. This 
left 16 per cent that could be used for development. Of 
course a single item and percentage for Nigeria for one year 
does not add much illumination. A large part of the assets 
held by the two countries is held by the governments, however, 
and a part of this may be spent on development. 
d. The other items in the tables, with the exception of the 
assets held by the banks, are partly earmarked for development 
schemes and partly tied up in special funds and working balances. 
In 1959, in Nigeria, one third of the sterling holdings of the 
regional governments was tied up in specific funds and working 
balances.54 In the same year 50 per cent of the total of 
the balances held by Native Authorities, Regional Production 
53Newlyn and Rowan, op. cit. 
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and Development Boards and other semi-o££icial government 
agencies, was held £or speci£ic £unds. Consequently, about 
3 1/2 per cent o£ the total was £ree £or development purposes 
through these groups. 
e. The sterling assets of the banks are "that portion 
of the assets of banks in the Colonies which is not employed 
locally,"55 While these assets may be lent to the governments 
by the depositors or the banks themselves, they do not repre-
sent the possibilities for development financing that the 
balances of the official or semi-official agencies do. The 
latter may be used by the government at its discretion in 
some cases and accrues to it through grants in others. The 
former may only be used if they are borrowed. 
On balance what can be said about the sterling assets 
of West Africa in respect to their possible use for development? 
Using the 1959 Nigerian situation as a guide it can be said 
that approximately 40.5 per cent of the total is not available 
for development. This is the sum of those funds which are 
held for specific purposes other than development. This 
leaves an unknown portion of the marketing board reserves, 
two thirds of the holdings o£ the Federal government, an 
optional portion of bank balances, and £ifty per cent o£ the 
55areat Britain, Cmnd. 827, op. cit. 
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remaining assets, as possible sources for development financing. 
While no specific figures can be cited, again using the 
Nigerian case as typical, it appears that over 50 per cent of 
the sterling assets held by West Africa could be used for 
development. That is, they are not restricted by legal or 
other institutional arrangements. 
West Africa and the Foreign Exchange Pool 
The gold and Foreign exchange earned in international 
trade must be turned in to the Exchange Equalization Account 
by members of the sterling area. From the end of World War II 
to 1956, the colonies, Ceylon, and the Union of South Africa 
were the only net contributors to the exchange pool.56 In 
this sense these colonies' status has differed from that of 
other members of the sterling area. Certain independent 
members have been allowed, from time to time, to hold gold 
reserves of their own.57 "For the colonies, however, the 
pooling of dollars was involuntary and automatic, since no 
colony held independent reserves of gold or foreign currencies."58 
This has meant that the colonies have had to gear their re-
quirements of foreign exchange to the state of the central 
56 6 Bell, op. cit., p. 2. 
57wright, op. cit., pp. 566-67. 58Ibid., p. 561. 
reserves which have been managed according to the needs or 
the whole sterling area. 
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It is essential to bear in mind that the reserves held 
in the Account constitute the reserves of the whole sterling 
area. The important relationship in the sterling mechanism 
is that between the central reserves, the net balances held 
in London by non-sterling countries, and the total debits 
incurred by sterling area countries in their dealings with 
outside countries.59 "The function of the reserves is to 
bridge any gap between debits and credits which may arise 
in these transactions."60 The reserves are increased or de-
creased only if the whole sterling area has a credit or debit 
with the rest of the world. If the area as a whole has 
earned more than it has paid to the non-sterling world, there 
will be net additions to the central reserves. If, on the 
other hand, payments are greater than earnings, there will be 
net drawings rrom the exchange pool. 
In the event that non-sterling members holding balances 
in London are willing to accept sterling as a means of inter-
national payment and do not convert their balances into 
foreign exchange, the reserves will be unaffected by a 
59Great Britain, Cmnd. 827, op. cit., p. 240. 
6oibid. 
sterling area debit with these countries. There will be a 
corresponding decrease in the central reserves i~ they do 
convert their balances beyond any net addition to reserves 
which the whole area may experience in any given period. 
This means that the central reserves must be 
large enough to cover whatever movement in 
their own reserves the monetary authorities 
in the rest o~ the sterling area are prepared 
to permit or may be unable to withstand.ol 
28. 
By the very nature o~ the sterling area agreements, it 
is understood that all sterling liabilities may be converted 
into ~oreign exchange under a policy of ~ree convertibility. 
Since the war, however, reserves have only been a ~raction 
o~ the total sterling liabilities o~ the United Kingdom.62 
It is apparent that the monetary theory upon which reserves 
and balances o~ the sterling area are based is analogous to 
that which underlies the operation o~ commercial banks; it 
is highly unlikely that all depositors will request their 
balances at the same time. I~ this did occur in the banking 
world, banks would merely call in loans in order to meet 
payment. I~ the situation arose in the sterling area, con-
vertibility would cease, and members would either restrict 
their calls or be ~aced with the possibility o~ the United 
Kingdom defaulting on part o~ its sterling commitments. 
61Ibid., pp. 239-240 b2 4 Ibid., p. 2 0. 
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The role of the West African members of the sterling area 
in supplying funds to the reserve pool can be seen by examin-
ing Tables 4, 5, and 6 which show the following: balance of 
payments on current account for Ghana and Nigeria; the value 
of the import and export surpluses experienced by each of 
these countries with the whole dollar area from 1947 to 1958; 
the value of the whole sterling area's deficit with the 
dollar area from 1947 to 1957; and the percentage of the 
sterling area's dollar area deficit that was offset by West 
African surpluses. 
Table 4 shows the balance of payments on current account 
for Ghana from 1950-1958 and for Nigeria from 1952-1958. 
Information for other years is not available. Admittedly, 
the seven years for which information is available for both 
countries does not show the balance of payments picture for 
West Africa over the fifteen years since the end of the war. 
Comparing Table 4 with Table 1, however, it can be seen that 
in every year from 1952-1957 the presence of a deficit or 
credit in the balance of payments occurred simultaneously with 
an increase or decrease in West African sterling balances. 
1955 is the only exception. In that year there was a balance 
of payments deficit and an increase in sterling assets. It 
is possible that this increase is a carry-over from the large 
surplus in the balance of payments from the previous year. 
TABLE 4 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
£ Millions 
Ghana Nigeria 
Total Total Total Total 
Year Current Current Balance Current Current Balance 
Receipts Payments Receipts Payments 
1950 93.0 73.0 120.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1951 112.1 92.8 119.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1952 108.5 97.0 111.5 144.9 132.3 112.6 
1953 115.7 110.5 I 5.2 138.2 129.7 I 8.5 
1954 142.5 101.7 140.8 164.4 136.2 /28.2 
1955 121.8 119.9 I 1.9 150.2 159.5 - 9.3 
1956 112.5 125.8 -13.3 152.1 177.1 -25.0 
1957 122.3 136.7 -14.4 149.3 180.7 -31.4 
1958 138.0 127.3 /10.7 155.5 195.7 -40.2 
Sources: Ghana, Economic Survey 1957, Accra: 1958, p. 30; Ghana, Economic Survel 
1958, Accra: 1959, p. 17; Nigeria, Economi~ S_llrv~y ~f _Ni@J:>_.ia, 1959, Lagos: 1959, p. 92. w 
0 
. 
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It can be seen from Table 5 that neither Gambia nor 
Sierra Leone have had a significant effect on the total sur-
plus or deficit of these West African countries as a whole. 
The Gold Coast (Ghana), on the other hand, contributes the 
lion's share of the overall surplus and accounts for nearly 
twice as much as Nigeria. The total surpluses are not im-
pressive when the deficit of the entire sterling area is 
examined in Table 6. With the exception of 1950, the deficit 
stands well over £ 200 million throughout the period. The 
West African surplus does become significant when converted 
into the percentage of the whole sterling area's deficit which 
it offsets. In absolute terms only 1950, 1951, and 1953 show 
a rather substantial role played by West African earnings. 
When viewed in light of the fact that every one of these 
African countries is, without a doubt, an underdeveloped 
nation, the percentages take on an entirely different meaning. 
Between four and seven per cent of the deficit of the entire 
sterling area with the dollar area was negated by the earnings 
of really two underdeveloped African countries in five out of 
eight years, and a much higher percentage in three out of 
eleven. 
Foreign exchange is a central consideration for a poor 
country. Development requires, among other things, the 
importation of capital. For many underdeveloped countries 
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TABLE 5 
VALUE OF WEST AFRICAN SURPLUSES AND DEFICITS WITH 
THE DOLLAR AREA 
1947-1958 
£. Millions 
Year Gold Nigeria Gambia Sierra Total Coast Leone 
1947 8 3 -.5 -.7 10.0 
1948 16 4 -.1 -.1 19.8 
1949 12 5 -.2 -.1 16.7 
1950 22 11 -.2 .3 33.1 
1951 26 12 -.2 .3 38.1 
1952 20 13 -.1 .4 33.3 
1953 21 10 -.1 .6 31.5 
1954 16 9 -.1 .5 25.4 
1955 12 5 -.2 .1 16.9 
1956 11 6 -.2 -.1 16.7 
1957 8 n.a. -.2 .01 7.8 
1958a 16 -1. -.1 .6 16.4 
Source: Great Britain, Statistical Abstract for the 
Commonwealth, London: 1951-1959. 
aAll 1958 figures cover trade only with the United 
States. 
TABLE 6 
VALUE OF STERLING AREA DEFICIT WITH DOLLAR AREA AND 
PERCENTAGE OFFSET BY WEST AFRICAN SURPLUSES 
1947-1957 
£ Millions 
33. 
Sterling Area Deficit Percent Offset By 
Year With Dollar Area West African Surpluses 
1947 757 1 
1948 466 4 
1949 459 4 
1950 53 38 
1951 247 14 
1952 586 5 
1953 304 10 
1954 324 7 
1955 515 3 
1956 334 5 
1957 580 1 
Source: Great Britain, Statistical Abstract for the 
Commonwealth, London: 1951-1959. 
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foreign exchange is difficult to come by, since they do not 
earn enough to supply their import needs. For West Africa, 
however, the situation is different; here is an area that 
earns a large amount of foreign exchange in the world markets, 
but which must gear its use of foreign exchange in general 
to an amount which is in harmony with the needs of the other 
members of the sterling area. To be sure, since free con-
vertibility was made the policy of the sterling area in late 
1958, each member theoretically has the right to make un-
limited drawings on the foreign exchange pool. The size of 
the pool is limited, however, and each member can anticipate 
that greedy requests would not be viewed favorably. That is 
to say, a dangerously depleted pool would again result in 
exchange restrictions for the sterling area. Consequently, 
the availability of foreign exchange to West Africa to finance 
capital imports is not only limited but less than the average 
e.3 per cent of all sterling area net dollar earnings con-
tributed by it. It should be pointed out that were West 
Africa not a member of the sterling area, it would have amass-
ed a considerable amount of foreign exchange since the end of 
the war, ceteris paribus. Under sterling area arrangements, 
while foreign exchange is available to West Africa, it is 
highly unlikely that they would be allowed to draw as much 
as they have contributed in the last fifteen years. 
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Another point is worth mentioning. For West Africa 
sterling is foreign exchange. In order to buy goods outside 
of West Africa sterling must be secured either to finance 
imports from the sterling area or in order to purchase foreign 
exchange. Sterling balances may be drawn upon, they may be used 
to convert West African currencies into sterling, or they may 
be used to secure sterling through loans or grants. In any 
case, to West Africa sterling represents something different 
from what it does to the United Kingdom or other independent 
members of the area. These countries, with central banking 
authorities who control the supply of money, can secure 
sterling in any amount by monetary creation, if they wish. 
In West Africa, where there have been no central banks until 
recently, the exchange of local currency for sterling meant 
a corresponding decrease in the supply of that currency. Con-
sequently, the sterling received for foreign exchange earnings 
was, in a sense, itself foreign exchange. 
The question may be asked whether there was merely a 
substitution of foreign exchange for sterling, which to West 
Africa represented another form of foreign exchange. Given 
the limitations on convertibility which existed until 1958, 
and the prospect of their return if needed, sterling could 
only be used freely within the sterling area. While the 
sterling area's market is vast it is, nevertheless, narrower 
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than a world market. It does not seem necessary to explore 
the discrimination that exists in the sterling area, or any 
multilateral closed trading unit, for that matter. What is 
important is that, because of the pooling arrangements, 
there has been a loss of foreign exchange that otherwise 
would have been available for development financing; in its 
place has been a currency which has been extensive in the 
markets it opened, but perhaps less commanding than that 
which was sacrificed. 
In light of the previous description of the basic oper-
ations of the sterling area, particularly in relation to the 
West African role within the area, what can be said of the 
costs and benefits of membership to these countries in rela-
tion to development finances? 
Inasmuch as the sterling area is the largest multi-
lateral trading unit in the world, membership carries with 
it all the benefits of such a system. West African members 
have the advantage of not having to raise the currencies of 
sterling area members in order to trade with them. 
Stable exchange rates have been another benefit. "If 
each member of the sterling area administered its own dollars, 
the value of each of the member currencies would fluctuate 
independently in terms of dollars. There would be no fixed 
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rate of exchange between sterling area countries.rr63 Fixed 
exchange rates thus bring with them the benefit of having 
all sterling currencies equal to each other by virtue of 
their common exchange rate with foreign currencies through 
the British pound sterling. 
Foreign exchange pooling allows West Africa to draw 
upon the reserves. If this group should cease to contribute 
more exchange than it uses, then this privilege would become 
important. For Gambia and Sierra Leone this advantage has 
been a long-standing one. 
The access to the London capital market that West 
African countries have enjoyed is a primary advantage of 
sterling area membership. West African banking institutions 
have all been, until the recent establishment of the central 
banks in Ghana and Nigeria, branches of large London banks; 
government loans are floated in the market; private capital 
flows to West Africa through London. The creditors enjoy 
the knowledge that West African currency may be converted 
into sterling at any time at a fixed exchange rate. These 
considerations are important to countries who have no capital 
markets of their own but who are, nevertheless, greatly in 
need of capital. 
West African members not only have an outlet for their 
accumulation of sterling balances, but their funds are 
63Meyer, op. cit., p. 32. 
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managed and invested for them by the Bank of England. 64 Thus, 
they have funds available for development plans or surpluses 
upon which they may draw in case of adverse shifts in the terms 
of trade. Deficits with members of the sterling area on 
current account may be financed by West African countries by 
shifting sterling from their London accounts to those of the 
surplus countries. 
Such are the benefits of West African membership in the 
sterling area. What are the costs? There are two main con-
siderations: (1) accumulated sterling balances; and (2) the 
pooling of foreign exchange reserves in London. 
The cost of having accumulated sterling balances can be 
measured in terms of the absence of the funds in the West 
African economies. Were they to provide sinking funds and 
cushions for export price changes, etc., as they do now and 
were held in the countries from which they originate, the 
capital and credit in the local markets would be greatly in-
creased. It might be argued that these balances could be 
transferred to West Africa at will. "If the use to which 
funds may be put is sharply restricted, however, the freedom 
to transfer funds means little."65 
b4areat Britain, Cmnd. H27, op. cit., pp. 112-13. 
b5Bell, op. cit., pp. 2H-29. 
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Furthermore, in view of the blocking agreements made 
with several independent members, it is doubtful whether the 
West African colonies would have been entirely free to draw 
down their balances rapidly. This could be argued even in 
the context of the recent establishment of sterling convert-
ibility. The colonies, even as independent members, would 
have to abide by the accepted code of monetary ethics of 
the sterling area. "Flagrant violation of any of the 
requirements . . . would have required other sterling area 
members to impose trade and payment restrictions against 
the violator."66 
The colonies obtain some benefits from the balances -
they yield interest; they help to finance the bank-
ing system; and they provide a reserve to be drawn 
on in bad years. Yet their investment of £ 1,000 
million in Britain does not accord well with commonly 
held ideas on the desirable direction of capital 
flow between countrieg at different levels of 
economic development. 7 
The most striking cost of sterling area membership for 
the colonies, and particularly West African members, has 
been the effect of foreign exchange pooling. In discussing 
the burden of the reserve pool, Bell remarks; "Surely the 
real burden, if there is one, falls upon the member which 
66 Wright, op. cit., p. 573. 
67A. Hazelwood, "Colonial External Finance Since the 
War," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XXI, 1953-54, p. 49. 
exports more than it imports in order to contribute to the 
pool."68 It is in this context that Bell, Wright and Polk 
all maintain that the colonies have had to give up dollars 
earned, while independent members have used these funds to 
finance balance of payment deficits.69 It should be ap-
preciated that the burden of contributing foreign exchange 
to the central reserve in London represents a real burden 
on West African countries which have been consistent con-
tributors to the pool. This burden can best be understood 
in terms of dollar goods, the import of which has had to 
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be foregone. Were it not for their membership in the sterl-
ing area, these countries would be free to spend their sur-
plus foreign exchange earnings as they pleased. The imports 
that these surpluses represent are recoupable only if West 
Africa becomes a net user of foreign exchange. There is no 
indication that this will become the case, at least not in 
the near future. As it is, Zupnick claims that colonies had 
to scrap some of their projects because of reserve contri-
butions. 7° 
68Bell, op. cit., p. 63. 
69Ibid., p. 62; Wright, op. cit., p. 574; J. Polk, 
Sterling, Its Meanin§ in World Finance, New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1956, p. I 2. 
70zupnick, op. cit., p. 83. 
One of the basic factors in the cohesion of the 
sterling area has always been the ability of the 
independent members to obtain capital from the 
United Kingdom and in a large part this has been 
effected through the dollar pooling operations. 
Broadly speaking, the United Kingdom has been 
able to maintain its capital exports to the in-
dependent sterling area countries only by passing 
on to them much of the dollar aid received during 
the early postwar years, and by importing capital 
from the colonial sterling area in more recent 
years.71 
It will not be attempted here to weigh the costs and 
the benefits of sterling area membership. The aim of this 
chapter was to establish the fact that for independent 
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members, membership in the sterling area is entirely volun-
tary, whereas for colonies, membership and conformity to the 
rules of the game has gone hand in hand with their involun-
tary political connection to the United Kingdom. For non-
independent members, particularly those in West Africa, the 
sterling area has had a great effect on their economic 
development. Since Chapter II will deal with West African 
public development programs and the sources of funds that 
have been used to finance them, it has been deemed advis-
able, before taking up that subject, to examine the principal 
features of the sterling area's financial mechanism. For the 
latter plays a large part in determining the origin of West 
African development funds. 
71 Wright, op. cit. 
II. BRITISH GRANTS-IN-AID AND WEST AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMS 
Development programs in Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and 
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Sierra Leone have taken the form of five and ten year plans 
since the end of World War II. The objectives of these pro-
grams have varied. Sierra Leone has aimed at increasing 
agricultural output. Nigeria has attempted to develop many 
industries simultaneously. The programs all involve a 
series of projects. Many of these are prerequisites to 
certain phases of the development plan and do not involve the 
production of a good directly. Roads, harbors, sanitary 
facilities, housing and railroads are projects of this type. 
Other projects contribute more directly to increasing the 
output of specific, or a range of, products. Irrigation 
schemes are of this nature. Finally, there are those projects 
which are concerned specifically with the output of a product. 
Investment to increase palm-kernel production in Sierra Leone 
is an example of this kind of project. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to judge the success 
or failure of the plans, or whether the economic criteria, if 
there have been any, upon which the plans have been drawn up 
and carried out, have been sound or not. The fact is that 
these public investment programs have been the major channel 
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through which the four West African countries have attempted 
economic development. 
Many of the projects within the development programs 
have necessitated the use of capital equipment not available 
in the country at their outset, others have laid the ground-
work for projects which will require this type of capital. 
In underdeveloped countries the sources of capital needed 
for investment schemes are usually not readily available. 
Private investment has seldom been in the form of capital 
equipment-producing industries. Consequently, these capital 
needs must be imported. In order to import, these countries 
must possess or secure foreign exchange. Generally speaking 
this can be done by earning it in the world markets through 
exports, by borrowing it, or by obtaining grants-in-aid. 
In the sterling area, however, there are certain special 
considerations for underdeveloped members. West African 
members may purchase goods from any part of the sterling area 
with sterling. If sterling is not currently earned in large 
enough amounts for current needs sterling balances may be 
drawn upon or West African currencies may be exchanged at a 
fixed rate for sterling. Sterling balances, however, have 
not been used to a very large extent for development programs; 
the problem is therefore one of raising other funds to finance 
development programs. When foreign exchange, other than sterl-
ing, is needed for imports it may be bought in Lonron. The 
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level of imports to be financed by sterling is dependent upon 
the government's ability to raise funds either from local or 
sterling area sources. 
There are really two major sources of public investment 
financing used by West African countries: (1) external, out-
side the sterling area; and (2) internal, within the sterling 
area. The former includes loans and assistance from all non-
sterling area countries and organizations. The latter may 
be divided into local and non-local sources. Local funds 
usually are raised from public revenues, local government 
loans, and loans and grants from the marketing boards. Non-
local sources have been in the form of loans floated on the 
London market, and United Kingdom loans and grants-in-aid. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to examine the role 
of United Kingdom grants-in-aid in financing West African 
public investment and the change in United Kingdom policy 
toward economic development in the colonies that has occurred 
since 1940. In order to make clear the importance of these 
grants to development financing from all internal sources, the 
other components of this heading will be examined first. 
West African Development Programs 
West African development programs are financed by funds 
secured from three main sources: local resources, loan funds, 
and Colonial Development and Welfare grants-in-aid. 
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Be£ore giving a detailed description o£ the components 
o£ these items, it seems advisable to discuss, however brie£ly, 
the role of each o£ them in the programs of the £our countries. 
Tables 7 and 8 show the sources of funds £or programs before 
and after 1955. Gambia has consistently relied upon Colonial 
Development and Welfare, (C.D. & W.) grants as the chie£ 
source o£ £inancing £or its development programs. For the 
Gold Coast both loan funds and local resources have been large 
sources o£ finance; before 1955 local resources were more 
than twice the size of loan sources, while £or the next nine 
years, the positions were nearly reversed. For Nigeria, the 
pre-1955 period was one in which C.D. & W. grants were the 
primary source of finance. A£ter 1955, while these contri-
butions remained sizeable, local resources took a decisive 
lead. Sierra Leone shows a consistent division among the three 
sources; while there is little absolute di£ference among the 
three, loan funds appear to be slightly larger than local and 
C.D. & W. grants. 
It should be noted that, while all of these countries 
are in the same geographical region and all are underdeveloped, 
their development plans rely upon the three categories listed 
in dif£ering degrees. This suggests that the magnitudes of 
the monetary sources open to each are different and changing, 
and at the same time that their problems of development are 
TABLE 7 
SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN 
OPERATION 1955 
£ Thousands 
Country Total C.D. & W. Loan Funds Local 
46. 
Resources 
Gambia 2,130 
Gold Coast 81,400 
Nigeria 48,911 
Sierra Leone 11,178 
1,500 
3,000 
23,739 
2,950 
200 430 
23,000 55,400 
15,267 9,905 
5,000 3,228 
Source: Great Britain, Colonial Development and 
Welfare Acts, Cmd. 9375, 1955, p. 24. 
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TABLE 8 
SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANS AFTER 1955 
£ Thousands 
Country Total C.D. & W. Loan Funds Local Resources 
Gambia 
1955-1960 975 859 116 
Gold Coasta 
1955-1964 130,601 500 81,711 48,400 
Nigeria a 
1955-1962 248,900 19,400 72,700 156,800 
Sierra Leone 
1956-1959 10,500 2,481 4,958 3,061 
Sources: British Information Services, The United King-
dom Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, I.D. 892 (Revised), 
March, 1955, p. 14; British Information Services, United King-
dom Aid to Africa, 1959, p. 3; Great Britain, The Colonial 
Territories 1956-1957, Cmnd. 195, 1957, p. 171; Great Britain, 
Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, Cmnd. 672, 1959, p. 11; 
Great Britain, Assistance from the United Kingdom for Overseas 
Development, Cmnd. 974, 1960, p. 17; Ghana, Second Development 
Plan, 1959-1964, Accra: 1959, p. 2; Nigeria, Economic Survey 
of Nigeria 1959, Lagos: 1959, p. 89. 
aBoth Ghana and Nigeria have development programs which 
call for more expenditure than either have in the way of 
known sources of finance. Only those funds which are known 
will be forthcoming are included in this table. 
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dissimilar despite outward similarities. These differences 
will become clearer through an examination of the components 
of the three headings. 
Tables 9-12 show composites of grants, loans and revenues 
which are either directly slated for development programs or 
represent sources from which development funds have been 
drawn. It should not be thought that these tables represent 
the various development funds themselves. They are merely 
the sources from which development finances may be drawn and 
not necessarily the amounts drawn from each source. Each of 
the four countries has a special fund set aside for the pur-
pose of administering these monies but, other than the major 
headings presented in Tables 7 and 8 a detailed description 
of the sources is not available. The exception is Nigeria. 
The development program for this entire nation is included in 
the £ 248 million 1955-62 plan. This is then broken down 
into a Federal Development Fund and separate funds for each 
of the three regions of Nigeria. 
Beyond this dearth of detailed information, there are 
several things which should be noted about Tables 9-12. 
Since funds are allocated before public investment programs 
are initiated, several items appear only once in each planning 
period. Other items, such as contributions from revenue and 
most C.D. & W. grants, appear each year as they are allocated. 
These are funds which can be counted on in advance and are 
therefore drawn into the programs only as needed. Inasmuch 
as official totals were available only for Gambia it was 
not thought pertinent to total the columns for the other 
three countries. 
Gambia 
Although Gambia received C.D. & W. funds as early as 
1945, its first development program was not begun until 
1951. 1 Table 9 shows the sources of revenue for Gambia. 
As was previously noted, C. D. & W. grants-in-aid provided 
the large majority of Gambia's development funds before and 
after 1955. While the grants have not been large, they 
have, for the most part, been growing. It is interesting 
to note that for the period 1960-64 there has been an ad-
ditional C.D. & w. allocation for Gambia amounting to £ 
2 1,000,000. The loan item that appears in Table 7 of £ 
200,000 was made before 1951 and therefore is not shown as 
a source in Table 9. 
The figures that appear under local sources for Gambia 
are total revenue figures for the various items and are 
therefore much larger than the subsequent amounts used for 
lGambia, Re ort on Development and Welfare 1950-1952, 
Sessional Paper No. l, Ba urst: Governmen Printer, ,p.l. 
2British Information Services, United Kingdom Aid to 
Africa, 1959, p. 6. 
TABLE 9 
SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN GAMBIA 
£ Thousands 
Source 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
C. D. & W. 167 58 137 92 84 132 111 149 225 
Local: 
Taxes 179 599 229 134 146 196 220 n.a. n.a. 
Customs n.a. 653 517 831 894 754 1,117 n.a. n.a. 
Currency Board 
18 Profits 13 5 15 13 13 13 n.a. n.a. 
Other Grants 25 68 78 74 67 83 103 n.a. n.a. 
Other 
-
48 225 271 399 227 511 n.a. n.a. 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --Total Gross 1,144 1,431 1,201 1,420 1,533 1,405 2,075 n.a. n.a. 
Sources: Great Britain, Colonial Reports: The Gambia 1956-1957, London: 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957; British Information Services, United 
Kingdom Aid to Africa, 1959, p. 3. 
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development programs. (They are only presented to show the 
major sources :from which the "Local Resources 11 headings in 
Tables 7 and 8 were drawn.) Taxes and customs are the 
largest sources o:r local revenue. The tax item is the sum 
o:r several taxes, including an income tax. Customs revenue 
accrue to the government through duties levied on the export 
o:r groundnuts, :for the most part. Regulation 16 o:r the West 
A:frican Currency Board states that: 11The Board may, with the 
approval o:r the Secretary of' State, pay any sum which it 
thinks proper out o:r its income by way o:r contribution to 
the revenue o:r the British West A:frican Governments."3 
This accounts :for the revenue :from currency board pro:fits. 
A source o:r local revenue, which does not appear in Table 9, 
is the money held in the Farmer's Fund. This :fund was set up 
to aid development schemes which are considered to be bene:ficial 
to the :farming community. The :fund is built up :from the 
di:f:ference between the price paid by the Ministry o:r Food :for 
4 groundnuts and the price paid locally by the :farmer. It 
may be noticed that Gambia, a small country, has not had 
extensive development programs. Those expenditures which were 
undertaken :for this purpose have been :financed, primarily out 
o:r grants-in-aid :from the United Kingdom. 
3w.T. Newlyn and D.C. Rowan, Money and Banking in British 
Colonial A:frica, Ox:ford: Clarendon Press, 1954, p. 48. 
4aambia, op. cit., p. 4. 
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Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone has undertaken its development programs by 
financing them primarily from loan funds. Table 7 shows 
these funds to be nearly twice the size of C. D. & W. grants, 
which in turn are smaller than the Local Resources item in 
both periods. The difference is not great, however, between 
any two of the three items. Table 10 shows Colonial Develop-
ment and Welfare grants-in-aid to Sierra Leone to have been 
perennial but not large. The most interesting item in Table 
10 is that labeled "Loans from U.K." Of the four West African 
countries, Sierra Leone is the only country other than Nigeria 
that has taken advantage of the London capital market and the 
United Kingdom as sources of loan capital.5 
"The standard method of raising new loans is to invite 
public subscriptions for an issue of inScribed stock under 
the Colonial Stock Acts." 6 The Colonial Stock Act, first 
5areat Britain, The Colonial Office, The Colonial 
Territories: 1950-51, Cmd. 8243; 1951-52, Cmd. 8553; 1952-53, 
Cmd. 8856; 1953-54, Cmd. 9169; 1954-55, Cmd. 9489; 1955-56, 
Cmd. 9769; 1956-57, Cmnd. 451; 1957-58, Cmnd. 780; 1958-59, 
Cmnd. 1065. 
6r. Greaves, "Colonial Monetary Conditions," Colonial 
Research Studies, Number 10, London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1953, p. 76. 
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enacted in 1877, enables colonies to issue stock in the 
London market. The Trustee status conferred on these London 
issues by the Colonial Stock Act of 1900 in fact guarantees 
the repayment of the loan; this is because the colonial 
government issuing the stock must pass the two following 
pieces of legislation before the stock can be issued: 
1. A 'General Loan and Inscribed Stock Ordinance• 
which defines general terms and conditions of 
loans to be raised in London under the Colonial 
Stock Acts; 
2. A 'Trustee investment in (Colony) Government 
Securities Ordinance• which authorizes the 
appropriation of any sum declared by a United 
Kingdom Court to be due to a stockholder, and 
concurs in the allowance of any ordinance ad-
versely affecting the rights of stockholders. 
(These provisions are required before a stock 
can be gr~nted trustee status in the United 
Kingdom) .1 
The loan itself is issued on behalf of the colony by the 
Crown Agents who manage the subsequent sinking funds. These 
sinking funds which are "attached provisions" of every issue 
act as a guarantee of security for any purchaser of the 
stock. The soundness of the stock is further enhanced by the 
fact that no colonial government has ever defaulted on a loan 
8 
or stopped interest payments. Finally, the Crown Agents 
themselves are the largest purchaser of these issues. 
7Ibid. 8 Ibid., p. 77. 
"Therefore, neither the internal budget position of a 
colonial territory, nor its external payments position, 
affect the standing of its public credit, any more than 
internal political conditions have so far affected it."9 
54. 
Consequently, Sierra Leone, a highly underdeveloped country, 
issued £ 2,030 million of stock on the London market in 
fiscal 1950/51 at 3 1/2% and£ 1,150 million in fiscal 
1953/54 at 3 1/2%. 10 Since the Commonwealth Economic 
Conference in Montreal in 1958, colonial governments have 
been able to make Exchequer loans to the extent that they 
cannot raise needed funds on the London market. 11 The£ 
1.6 million 1960 loan to Sierra Leone in Table 10 is an Ex-
chequer loan. 12 Local sources for development programs in 
Sierra Leone have been raised, as in the case of all four 
countries, primarily from customs duties. 
9rbid. 
lOGreat Britain, The Colonial Office, The Colonial 
Territories: 1950-51, Cmd. 8243; 1951-52, Cmd. 8553; 
1952-53, Cmd. 8856; 1953-54, Cmd. 9169; 1954-55, Cmd. 9489; 
1955-56, Cmd. 9769; 1956-57, Cmnd. 451; 1957-58, Cmnd. 780; 
1958-59, Cmnd. 1065. 
llareat Britain, Assistance from the United Kingdom 
for Overseas Development, Cmnd. 974, 1960, p. 9. 
12Ibid. 
TABLE 10 
SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN SIERRA LEONE 
£ Thousands 
Source 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
C. D. & W. 198 282 581 589 479 467 655 247 177 
Grants from 
Marketing Boards 
- - 15 146 - - n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Loans from U.K. 
-
1,150 - - - - n.a. n.a. 1,600 
Local Sources: 
Customs 2,233 2,375 3,562 4,262 5,356 5,887 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Taxes 1,562 2,002 2,476 1,518 2,441 5,887 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Loans 
- - - - 1,257 
Sources: Great Britain, Colonial Reports: Sierra Leone 1954, London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956, p. 20; Great Britain, Colonial Reports, Sierra 
Leone 1957, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959, p. 25; Great Britain, 
Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, Cmd. 672, 1959, p. 11; Great Britain, Assist-
ance from the United Kingdom for Overseas Development, Cmd. 974, 1960, p. 17. 
\Jl 
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Ghana 
The situation in Ghana is strikingly different from that 
of Gambia or Sierra Leone. Before 1955 the Gold Coast's 
development programs were financed primarily out of local 
resources. After 1955 there was a shift to borrowing and a 
decrease in the importance of local revenues as a source of 
finance. It should be noted that Table 8 shows the expected 
and not the actual sources for Ghana's development programs 
for 1955-1964. For instance, the sum of the various loan 
sources in Table 11 for the 1955-1958 period, comes nowhere 
near the £ 81 million shown in the loan column in Table 8. 
This is because Ghana has not yet secured loans covering that 
amount. It expects to borrow £ 25 million from the reserves 
of the Cocoa Marketing Board during the 1959-1964 period. 13 
From 1951 to 1958, as shown in Table 11, the majority of 
loans were obtained from the marketing board. 
As noted in Chapter I, the marketing boards were set up 
to accumulate reserves in prosperous years and draw upon them 
in slump years, so as to stabilize producers• prices and in-
comes. The accumulated reserves may be lent to the govern-
ment as well as invested in United Kingdom Treasury Bills. 
13Ghana, Second Development Plan 1959-1964, Accra: 
Government Printer, 1959. 
TABLE 11 
GHANA 
£ Thousands 
Source 1951/52 1952/53 1953/54 1954/55 1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 
C. D. & W. 
Grant sa 144 72 414 762 6oo 1,007 
Loans: 
Cocoa Marketing Board 2,242 - 3,865 2,408 3,000 n.a. n.a. 
Local 
- - 500 2,498 
Issue of Bills 
- - - - -
3,000 
C. D.C. 
-
n.a. 385 502 552 325 275 
Other 
- - 2,445 
Local Resources: 
Taxes0 27,252 35,562 40,041 66,469 60,300 37,200 47,500 
Grants: 
Marketing Board - 2,434 2,097 2,410 3,200 2,800 3,000 
Otherc 3,269 4,718 5,700 16,600 - 6,900 9,600 
Sources: British Information Services, United Kingdom Aid to Africa, 1959, p. 3; 
Great Britain, Develolment and Welfare Acts, Cmd. 672, 1959, p. 11; Ghana, Economic 
Survey, 1958, Accra: 959, p. 74; The Gold Coast, Economic Survey, 1953, Accra: 1953, 
p. 62; The Gold Coast, Economic Survey, 1954, Accra: 1954, p. 6. 
(continued). 
\Jl 
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aAfter independence in 1956 Ghana was no longer eligible for C.D. & W. 
grants. The 1956/57 figure is a carry-over from the pre-independence cornrnittment. 
bThe largest portion of tax revenue is the duty collected on cocoa exports. 
cThis item includes other types of local revenue such as income from government 
property, revenue on government investments and import duties. 
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The amounts available for government borrowing are closely 
related to the market conditions for cocoa. That is, if 
prices fall and cocoa revenue decreases there will be a 
smaller amount of reserves available that can be lent to the 
government. 
Another source of development capital shown in Table 11 
is the Colonial Development Corporation (C.D.C.). The C.D.C. 
was set up under the Overseas Resources Development Act of 
1948. 14 "The Corporation was brought into being for the 
purpose of improving the standard of living of the Colonial 
peoples by increasing their productivity and wealth. 11 15 The 
Corporation has the power to borrow £ 150 million long-term 
and£ 10 million short-term from the British Exchequer. 16 
The £ 68 million it has borrowed so far have been invested 
in projects, either directly or through lending to colonial 
governments for specific projects. When the Corporation in-
vests directly in projects it acts as a partner and shares 
the projects; when it lends to colonial governments it charges 
standard interest rates. 17 There are two significant features 
l4Great Britain, Cmnd. 974, op. cit., p. 9. 
15areat Britain, Colonial Development Corporation Report 
and Accounts 1948, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1949, p. 6. 
l6Great Britain, Cmnd. 974, op. cit., p. 9. 
17areat Britain, Colonial Development Corporation Report 
and Accounts 1958, London: Her Majesty 1s Stationery Office, 
1959, p. 10. 
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about the C.D.C. worth noting here. First, the C.D.C., which 
only invests in or lends for the purpose of financing specific 
projects, is run like a private corporation and is expected 
to show a profit. 18 Second, the Corporation's funds are only 
to be lent to colonial governments and not to independent 
members. 19 Thus, while the Corporation still has a hand in 
the projects it has begun when colonies become independent 
and acts in an advisory capacity to those independent govern-
ments who request it, new financial aid stops flowing when 
countries cease to be colonies. 20 In West Africa the C.D.C. 
operates through an agency company, the West African Develop-
ment Corporation, Ltd. 21 
For Ghana, as for Gambia and Sierra Leone, the local re-
sources item is made up mostly of export duties. Since Ghana's 
largest export is cocoa, this source of finance is closely tied 
to market conditions as are the loans and grants from the 
marketing board. It is entirely possible that the grants and 
1eibid. 
19Great Britain, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into 
the Financial Structure of the Colonial Development Corporation, 
Cmnd. 786, 1959, p. 2. 
20Ibid. 
21Great Britain, Colonial Development Corporation Report 
and Accounts 1958, op. cit., p. 64. 
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loans made by the marketing board to the government are inde-
pendent of market conditions inasmuch as the board holds 
large surpluses. For instance, the Second Development Plan 
1959 - 1964 states that the reserves of the Cocoa Marketing 
Board, £G 55 million, will supply £G 25 million over the five 
year period to the development fund; 22 the remainder is needed 
as a working balance. Ultimately, however, the conditions in 
the world cocoa market will determine the level of the market-
ing board's reserves. A sustained drop in cocoa prices will 
not only cut cocoa revenues but will generate flows from the 
reserves to the farmers over a long period. On the other 
hand, higher prices in the world market for cocoa will permit 
an increase in the reserves and therefore the amounts avail-
able for lending to the government. In 1951-1958, when the 
majority of funds for development plans were secured from 
loan and local resources and these in turn were supplied 
largely by marketing board grants and loans to the government 
or by revenues from cocoa duties, finance was therefore 
closely tied to market conditions. 
22ahana, Second Development Plan 1959-1964, op. cit. 
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Nigeria 
The Nigerian situation in regard to development programs 
is somewhat more complex than that of the other three countries 
mentioned. Public development expenditures are undertaken by 
three major groups: (1) certain statutory corporations and 
boards; (2) the various regional governments; and (3) the 
Federal Government. This division can be explained as 
follows. 
(1) It is believed that "certain public services can 
often be better provided by statutory bodies than by the 
Governments themselves ••• "23 Examples of these bodies are 
railroad and electricity corporations. As a group these 
statutory bodies are expected to spend £ 120 million in 1955-
1962.24 They are responsible for raising£ 63.3 million of 
this total expenditure. 25 
(2) Nigeria is composed of four regions; the Northern 
Region, the Western Region, the Eastern Region and the Southern 
Cameroons. While the£ 248,900,000 figure of total development 
finances in Table 8 includes the Federal Government and the 
regions, it does not include the Southern Cameroons. The other 
23Nigeria, Economic Survey of Ni~eria 1959, Lagos: 
Federal Government Printer, 1959, p.8. 
24rbid. 25rbid. 
three regions are responsible for contributing to the develop-
ment finances. They do this mainly from local revenues; they 
are also allowed to issue debt. Only the Federal Government, 
however, is allowed to issue external debt.26 The regional 
governments began to receive Colonial Development and Welfare 
grants-in-aid in April of 1955.21 
(3) Table 12 shows the sources of finance for the 
Federal share of the development programs. It should be 
noted that public development programs in Nigeria were first be-
gun in 1946 and that several of the items presented in the table 
are unspent balances from that 1946 allocation. In 1945 for 
instance, £ 23 million was granted from c. D. & W. funds in 
order to begin the Nigerian ten year plan. 28 By fiscal 1951/52, 
£ 15,455 thousand was left from the original sum. In 1951 
it was felt by the Nigerian Government that conditions had 
changed so much since the time of the original plan that it 
was necessary to revise it. 29 Consequently a revised plan 
26Great Britain, Overseas Economic Surveys, Nigeria, 
London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957, p. 47. 
27Ibid., p. 49. 
28Nigeria, A Ten Year Plan of Development and Welfare for 
Nigeria 1946, Sessional Paper No. 24 of 1945, Lagos: Government 
Printer, 1946, p. 1. 
29Nigeria, A Revised Plan of Development and Welfare for 
Nigeria 1951-1956, Sessional Paper No. 6 of 1951; Lagos: 
Government Printer, 1951, p. 5. 
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was drawn up and the necessary allocations were made. In 
1954 there was a major change instituted in the structure of 
the development program in Nigeria. Whereas previously there 
had been two separate units administering development funds, 
it was now believed that a single development fund would 
better serve the purpose. Thus the C.D. & W. grants-in-aid 
and the Development Loan Fund were consolidated.3° In 1955 
it was felt that the revised plan had been carried out and that 
a new plan was needed. Consequently, a new five year program 
was prepared in that year and later extended to cover seven 
years.31 
Turning again to Tables 7 and 8, it will be noticed that 
c. D. & w. grants provided the majority of the finance for 
the first development program and decreased by a little over 
£ 4 million for the 1955-1962 period. The post-1955 program 
is nearly six times as large as the 1946 and 1951 consolid-
ated programs. Owing to this smaller grant and the increased 
size of the program, there was a shift in the second plan, in 
so far as finances are concerned, to the use of local resources. 
3°Nigeria, The Economic Programme of the Government of 
the Federation ot Nigeria 1955-1960, Sessional Paper No. 2 
of 1956, Lagos: Federal GOvernment Printer, 1956. 
31Ibid., and Economic Survey of Nigeria 1959, Lagos: 
Federal Government Printer, 1959, p. 89. 
TABLE 12 
SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN NIGERIA 
£ Millions 
Source 1951/52 1952/53 1953/54 1954/55 1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 
C.D.& W. 
Loans: 
External 
I.B.R.D. 
_, U.K. 
C.D.C. 
Local: 
15.5a 
11.3 
06.8 
00.05 
Revenue o8.od 
Internal Borrowing 14.or 
Grants: 
Marketing Boards 
External 
Loan Development 
Fund Contribu-
tionsJ 03.7 
00.8 00.7 
03.2 04.5 
02.6 01.8 03.3 03.2 03.9 
1o:ob 
- - - -00.2 
-
15-.0c 
00.9 01.4 00.5 00.2 00.05 
137.oe 
47.7g 
12.~ 
01.7 
......... Continued 
0'\ 
\]1 
. 
TABLE 12 - Continued 
Sources: British Information Services, United Kingdom Aid to Africa, 1959, 
p. 3; Great Britain, Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, Cmnd. 672, 1959, p. 11; 
Great Britain, Colonial Development Corporation, Reports and Accounts, London: 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948-1959; Great Britain, Assistance from the 
United Kingdom for Overseas Development, Cmnd. 974, 1960, pp. 8-9, 17; Nigeria, 
A Revised Plan of Develo ment and Welfare for Ni eria 19 1-19 6, Sessional Paper 
No. o 1951, Lagos: 1951, p. 10; Niger a, Est ates o he Government of 
Nigeria, 1953-19f4, Lagos: 1954, p. 12and Appendix A-5; Nigeria, Estimates of 
the Government o the Federation of Nigeria, 1959-1960, Lagos: 1959, p. 227; 
Nigeria, Economic Survey of Nigeria 1959, Lagos: 1959, p. 89. 
ac.D.& w. grants from 1946-1954 under £ 23 million 1946 grant. 
br.B.R.D. loans for 1955-1962. 
crncludes £ 12 million Commonwealth Assistance Loan to be made after independ-
ence in 1960 and a £ 3 million Exchequer Loan to be made before independence. 
dRevenue contribution for the revised 1951-1956 plan. 
eRevenue contribution for the 1955-1962 plan. 
fBorrowing from the Regional Marketing Boards for the 1951-1956 plan. 
gincludes loan from marketing board for 1955-1962 plan. 
hMarketing Board grant for 1955-1962 plan. iFor 1955-1962 plan. 
JBefore Federation in 1954 the Loan Development Fund was a separate entity. 
After 1954 the Federal Development Fund was set up to encompass all Federal develop-
ment expenditures. 0'1 
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As in the other three countries, Nigerian local resources for 
development programs are mostly secured from customs duties. 
Nigeria's largest export duty is on cocoa while the majority 
of import duties accrue from unmanufactured tobacco, gasoline, 
beer and wine.32 Grants and loans from the marketing boards 
are also included in the local resources item. 
Nigeria has received loans from various sources, in-
eluding the United Kingdom and the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development. It has been the largest re-
cipient of Colonial Development Corporation loans in West 
Africa. Local loans have provided the majority of loan income, 
however, and these have come almost entirely from the market-
ing boards. 
It should therefore be clear at this point that different 
methods of financing public development programs are used in 
each of the four West African countries. The two smaller 
members, Gambia and Sierra Leone, finance the major part of 
their programs from different sources. The former uses al-
most exclusivel~ c. D. & W. grants-in-aid for a rather 
limited program; the latter draws upon loan and local funds 
32Nigeria, Estimates of the Government of the Federation 
of Nigeria 1959-1960, Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1959, 
p. 12. 
in excess of the c. D. & w. funds and has had programs five 
and ten times the size of Gambia's as far as expenditure is 
concerned. Ghana, on the other hand, has received a rela-
tively small amount of the c. D. & w. grants to West Africa 
and has relied on loans and local funds. These loans have, 
for the most part, come from internal sources such as the 
Cocoa Marketing Board. The same can be said for Nigeria, 
but here there has also been a large amount of external 
borrowing that is not found in other programs. Nigeria is 
the only one of the four West African countries that has re-
ceived a loan from the I.B.R.D. and numerous loans from the 
c.D.c. 
Before passing to the details of c. D. & w. grants-in-
aid, it may be worth restating that the aforementioned 
sources of funds for West African development programs do not 
cover the entire range of resources used by them. The de-
scription has been limited to sources within the sterling 
area. There have been some non-sterling area grants and loans 
but these have been a small part of the total. Nigeria, for 
instance, has received grants from the International Co-
operation Administration.33 In addition, there have been 
33Nigeria, Estimates of the Government of the Federation 
of Nigeria 1959-1960, Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1959, 
p. 227. 
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numerous small grants ~rom the United Kingdom other than those 
allocated under the c. D. & w. Act. Ghana, ~or example, has 
received grants ~or the Kumasi College o~ Technology ~or the 
last three years. The other three countries have all re-
ceived miscellaneous grants.34 0~ the various sources o~ 
~ds available ~or West A~rican development programs, the 
primary concern here is with the grants-in-aid ~rom the 
United Kingdom. 
Colonial Development and Wel~are Grants-In-Aid 
There have been two major periods o~ United Kingdom aid 
to its colonies, 1929-1939 and 1940 to the present. The 
~ormer was an era in which British policy toward economic de-
velopment in its colonies was predicated on the belie~ that 
development should be on a pay-as-you-go basis. The latter 
period saw a reversal o~ that policy. 
The purpose o~ the Colonial Development Act o~ 1929 was 
to aid and develop agriculture and industry, "thereby promot-
ing commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom • • • 11 35 
Consequently the Act set up the Colonial Development Fund to 
34British Information Services, op. cit., pp. 4-6. 
35areat Britain, Colonial Development, Cmd. 3357, London: 
1929, p. 1. 
allocate funds provided by the Parliament for colonial de-
velopment.36 The annual expenditure was not to exceed £ 
l,Ooo,ooo. Funds were distributed in the form of grants and 
loans. Table 13 shows the total assistance given by the 
Colonial Development Fund from 1929-1940 and the division be-
tween grants and loans. It can be seen that grants were in 
excess of loans both in total and for the four West African 
countries. In this period, when annual allocations were 
limited to £ 1 million a year, the total appropriation over 
the eleven year period was relatively close to the limit. 
It will be shown later that allocations under the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Acts have been far less than the 
statutory limits set by the acts. 
In assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the 
1929 Act's purposes, the Colonial Development Advisory Com-
mittee made the following observations in its 1941 report: 
(1) the committee " ••• have been obliged ••• to reject 
schemes where there has appeared no reasonable ground for 
anticipating that the Colonies concerned would be in a posi-
tion to meet from their own resources the subsequent neces-
36Ibid. 
TABLE 13 
TOTAL ASSISTANCE UNDER THE COLONIAL 
DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1929 
1929-1940 
Total Loans 
Total Allocations 8,875,083 3,203,427 
West African Share: 
Gambia 25,265 
Gold Coast 161,348 73,000 
Nigeria 330,353 
Sierra Leone 632,633 504,920 
£' s 
Grants 
5,671,656 
25,265 
88,348 
330,353 
137,713 
Source: Great Britain, Colonial Development Advisory 
Committee 11th and Final Report, Cmd. 6298, London: 1941, 
pp. 11, 12, and 15. 
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sary cost of maintenance ••• 1137 and consequently# "This 
restriction has limited the value of the Act in those terri-
tories whose finances were weakest and where need for assist-
ance was# therefore# the most felt;"38 (2) "The most hampering 
of the restrictions has been that which in general has limited 
the Committee to consideration of schemes which were of a 
capital nature and which were related to a policy of material 
development; 1139 and (3) development has been fostered and 
"Side by side with that development has gone a considerable 
contribution to employment in this country."40 An attempt 
was made in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 
to remedy the short-comings of the 1929 Act. 
The 1940 Act provided a somewhat different direction, at 
least as far as policy is concerned, than the 1929 Act. The 
purpose became to "make provision for promoting the develop-
ment of the resources of Colonies, protectorates# protected 
states and mandated territories and the welfare of their peoples, 
and for relieving colonial and other Governments from liability 
in respect of certain loans.u4l Thus, the Act extended the 
37areat Britain, Colonial Development Advisory Committee 
11th and Final Report, Cmd. 6298, LOndon: 1941, p.~(. 
38rbid., p. 9. 39Ibid. 4orbid., p. 8. 
4lareat Britain, Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 
1940, Chapter 40, p. 1. 
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purpose of the loans and grants to the promotion of welfare 
as well as economic development and therefore enabled colonies 
to make expenditures on projects other than those which were 
of a capital nature. Furthermore, the 1940 Act carried with 
it a basic change in British colonial policy. 
The existence of the Fund (Colonial Development Fund) 
has not involved any departure from the old principle 
that a Colony should have only those services which 
it can afford to maintain out of its own resources. 
This principle now calls for revision, and the Govern-
ment propose that in appropriate cases money from the 
new sources which they have it in mind to provide 
should be made available for the maintenance of im-
portant works or services over a substantial period 
of years.~2 
The most drastic change which carne with the 1940 Act was 
that allocation of funds was to be related to projects that 
were part of comprehensive development programs. With this 
end in mind the British Government invited "Colonial Govern-
ments to prepare development programmes for a period of years 
ahead."43 Moreover, the funds that were to be used for loans 
and grants-in-aid were to be allocated yearly on the basisof 
annual requirements and were not to be deposited into a 
development fund as the 1929 Act provided. The Colonial De-
velopment Fund was dissolved and all monies deposited into 
42Great Britain, Statement of Policy on Colonial De-
velopment and Welfare, Cmd. 6175, London: 1940, p. 5. 
43 8 Ibid., p. • 
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the Exchequer. 44 The limit on assistance was increased to a 
maximum of£ 5 million a year for ten years.45 
The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts since 1940 have 
been substantially the same in their outlook. The allocations 
have been increased by each act until the 1959-1968 Act added 
£ 95 million, thereby increasing the total allocation for 
1946-1964 to£ 315 million. 46 The spending of these c. D. & W. 
allocations has been slow and there have been surpluses in the 
form of unspent balances as each new act has been passed.47 
It is interesting to note that in 1945 there were to be 
no specific economic criteria used in allocating c. D. & w. 
funds. "All factors which were known to be relevant were 
taken into account, including the size and population of the 
territory, its known economic resources and possibilities, the 
present state of development, the development schemes known to 
exist or to be under contemplation, and the financial resources 
44areat Britain, Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 
1940, op. cit. 
45areat Britain, Cmd. 6175, op. cit., p. 6. 
46areat Britain, Cmnd. 974, op. cit., p. 9. 
47rbid · Great Britain Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, cma. 9375, London: 19S5R-,---..p""""._.,.7_. ----'----=--------
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likely to be available locally."48 This was reiterated in 
1955.49 
There have been two significant changes in the postwar 
c. D. & w. Acts which appear to depart substantially from 
the tone set in the 1940 Act and suggest a return to the 
prewar philosophy. The first is the emphasis on capital 
projects which are revenue-producing. While there is recog-
nition of the need for projects which are not revenue-pro-
ducing, such as sanitary and educational facilities, the 
importance of capital projects which yield a return is never-
theless emphasized. Thus the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies said to the United Kingdom Parliament in April of 
1955: 
••• my predecessor underlined the need for a proper 
emphasis on economic development in the following 
words: "I do not underestimate the importance of 
basic social improvement in Colonial territories. 
But Colonial Governments will defeat their own 
object if they saddle themselves with a crippling 
burden of recurrent charges on capital which does 
not earn a return. The only certain way of pro-
viding for these recurrent charges is to see that 
a proper place is given in development plans to 
those basic services which make a more direct 
contribution to the expansion of the territory's 
resources." Generally speaking, this has been 
48Great Britain~~Colonial0Develzgment and~Welfare Despatch Dated November 12, I 5, Cmd. 713, nabn: 19 5, p. 3. 
49Great Britain, Colonial Development and Welfare Despatch 
Dated April 26, 1955; Cmd. 9462, London: 1955, p. 4. 
the approach of Colonial Governments to the 
planning of development, but it is of such 
fundamental importance for the future economic 
and social well-being of the colonial terri-
tories that I feel that0the principle cannot be too often restated.5 
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Thus it appears that an economic criterion has actually 
been used for choosing projects which were to be part of 
development programs and for which c. D. & W. funds were to 
be allocated. Projects with the prospect of yielding the 
greatest return were the ones to be favored. The importance 
of this point can be appreciated in light of the fact that 
since West African development programs include projects 
which yield no revenue, those projects which do net a return 
must do so in excess of the costs of maintenance and replace-
ment if they are to aid in offsetting the costs of upkeep and 
replacement for non-revenue-producing projects. For, while 
grants-in-aid and loans in excess of current revenues aid a 
country in its development, it is not to be assumed that they 
automatically make no provision for the future costs of main-
taining the capital which is a part of the development 
projects. 
The second apparent change from the tone of the 1940 
policy regarding colonial development is that the United 
5°rbid., p. 5. 
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Kingdom has encouraged and requested that colonial govern-
ments, whenever possible, use local and external (non-
sterling) funds to finance their development programs. 
Governments will naturally continue to look 
first to their own financial resources, in-
cluding the greatest possible use of their 
sterling assets held in London, and will 
need carefully to examine the possibilities 
of raising additional revenuesfor develop-
ment. I consider it right also that they 
should, over the next five years, make the 
maximum possible use of all external sources 
of loan finance available to them.51 
This policy was reaffirmed in 1959.52 
Has there, then, been even a formal change in British 
policy toward colonial economic development? While there 
have been limitations set on the allocation of c. D. & w. 
funds, these have resulted from the application of an economic 
criterion quite different from that which was used in connection 
with the 1929 Act. Expenditures under the pre 1940 alloca-
tions were designed to aid agriculture and industry "thereby 
promoting commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom;" 
After 1940 the purpose became to promote the development and 
welfare for colonial peoples. Furthermore, the emphasis on 
capital and revenue-producing projects since 1940 must be 
viewed in light of the long-term development plans. 
51 Ibid. 
52areat Britain, Committee on the Worki~ of the Monetary 
System Report, Crnnd. 827, London: 1959, p. 2 • 
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Provision for depreciation and replacement expenditures on 
the projects which the grants helped to finance had to be 
made. Unless grants were to be spent for maintaining old 
projects at the sacrifice of new ones, these funds would 
have to be raised from some other source. Revenue and 
capital-producing projects not only maintain themselves but 
provide capital and finance for new, as well as non-revenue-
producing, projects. 
The most substantial difference between the two periods, 
however, is one of objectives. Before 1940 the sums were 
extremely small. The amounts going to each colony were 
hardly enough to indicate that there was any conscious policy 
concerning economic development. And this is just the point. 
The change in United Kingdom policy has been one of purpose. 
In the last fifteen years, (the grants did not really begin 
until 1945) not only have the absolute allocations increased 
steadily, but British colonial economic policy has been di-
rected at aiding and accelerating economic development in 
the colonies. No longer do the British insist that develop-
ment be on a pay-as-you-go basis; they encourage borrowing 
and the acceptance of grants and assistance from outside the 
Commonwealth. The United Kingdom has,been generous in its 
own grants-in-aid to its colonies. 
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It has been shown that West African members of the 
sterling area are holders of large sterling balances which 
increased in every year but two from 1945 to 1957. Moreover, 
they were net contributors of dollars to the foreign exchange 
pool every year during that penod. It was also noted that 
the sterling assets of colonial members were managed by the 
Bank of England and invested in United Kingdom Treasury 
Bills. Thus, it was shown that there have been sizeable 
flows of capital from West Africa to the United Kingdom. 
At the same time capital flows from the United Kingdom 
to West Africa, in the form of c. D. & w. grants, were also 
shown to have occurred annually during the same period. 
These grants normally are financed out of the British budget, 
which in turn is partly financed out of revenues raised 
through the sale of Treasury Bills to West African sterling 
balance holders. 
In light of the simultaneous existence of these two flows 
and the fact that the former has exceeded the latter in size, 
it may be asked whether the c. D. & w. Acts have, in fact, 
constituted a substantive change in United Kingdom policy or 
whether West Africa has continued to finance its development 
out of what is, in reality, its own financial resources. 
Chapter III will explore the implications of the formal change 
in United Kingdom policy toward economic development in its 
colonies. 
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III. GRANTS-IN-AID AND STERLING BALANCES 
The previous two chapters dealt with two financial 
flows: the flow of sterling and foreign exchange from West 
Africa to London (Chapter I) and the flow of grants-in-aid 
from London to West Africa (Chapter II). During the seven 
years from fiscal 1950/51 to 1956/57 (the last year for which 
relevant information is available), West African sterling 
balances increased £ 207 million, or an average of £ 29.5 
million per year. In that same period C.D. & W. grants to 
West Africa increased £ 22 million, or£ 3.2 million per 
year. 
The result is a situation which differs substantially 
from that which one would normally expect to arise as a con-
sequence of capital allocation in the form of grants-in-aid. 
There are three major reasons for this: (1) West Africa has 
had surpluses in its balance of payments on current account 
for most of the period in which it has received C.D. & w. 
grants; (2) West Africa has held large sterling assets since 
1945; and (3) there is the possibility that the burden of 
supplying C.D. & w. grants-in-aid has not fallen upon the 
British. 
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1. Grants are usually thought of as a form of capital 
receipts which allow a country to import more than it ex-
ports without drawing on its own resources. But from the 
end of the war to 1955 West Africa exported more than it 
imported. While United Kingdom grants permitted West African 
imports to rise, they neither brought about nor contributed 
to a deficit in the balance of payments on current account 
in this period. Although the imports that resulted from the 
expenditure of grants brought the surplus in the balance of 
payments to a lower level than would have existed if these 
products had not been imported, these same imports could have 
been purchased in any given surplus period, so long as the 
surplus was larger than the grants, without drawing upon 
additional domestic resources. 
Thus, Hazelwood wrote: 
Development and welfare policy implies that the 
colonies should receive gifts and loans and 
£ 211 million has, in fact, been made available 
for this purpose, ••• But, in reality, this sum 
has not been effectively transferred. Instead 
of the external current account deficit ne-
cessary if they were to absorb this amount, the 
colonies have been heavily in surplus ••• thus 
the colonies ~ave been exporting capital, not 
importing it. 
1A. Hazelwood, "Colonial External Finance Since the 
War," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XXI, 1953-1954, 
p. 48. 
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It should be noted that Hazelwood wrote on the basis or 
data no more recent than 1951. Moreover, his conclusions 
were based on balance of trade calculations, since balance 
or payments data were not then, and are not now, available ror 
those years. In any event, his conclusions seem to hold true 
ror the entire postwar period until 1955. For, the balance 
of payments data that did become available arter 1951 show that 
West Arrica enjoyed a surplus in the current account up to, and 
including, 1954. 2 It can also be pointed out that C.D. & w. 
grants to West Africa were so sma113 that, while they reduced 
surpluses in the balance or payments on current account, they 
did not do so appreciably. 
While grants did decrease West African surpluses on 
current account, if only to a minor extent, increases in 
sterling balances resulting from such surpluses were in no way 
afrected. If West Africa, for example, had an export surplus 
of £ 50 before grant expenditures, a grant of £ 10 resulting 
in the same amount of imports would have decreased the surplus 
to £ 40, as long as the receipt or grants is not recorded in 
the current account. Assuming that all surpluses were de-
posited in sterling accounts, £ 50 would have been deposited 
before the grant expenditure and £ 40 after. Had the grant 
been deposited in West Africa's sterling account as a reimburse-
ment ror an expenditure of £ 10 on imports, the total increase 
2Table 4. 3Table 14. 
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in that account would have been £ 50; that is, the current 
account surplus of £ 40 plus the grant of £ 10. Had the 
grant been made directly to West Africa before expenditure, 
the increase in West Africa's sterling account would still 
have amounted to £ 50, since the original surplus of £ 50 
that existed before expenditure from the grant would then 
have been deposited in London. 
Since 1955 West Africa has experienced deficits on 
current account. According to Hazelwood, this would mean 
that c. D. & W. grants were effectively transferred to West 
Africa. Grants-in-aid were not entirely responsible for 
these balance of payments deficits, since the deficits were 
considerably larger than the grants. Undoubtedly, however, 
the grants were still a contributory factor. 
2. It is hard to associate the possession of large and 
unutilized capital assets with the receiving of grants-in-
aid. It is generally understood that grants are made in 
order to provide goods and services to countries that could 
not acquire them by other means. Since the end of World War 
II West Africa has been in possession of large sterling balances 
which have continued to grow until recently. If the data in 
Table I, and Table 7 are compared, it can be seen that West 
Africa has had the means to purchase all the imports financed 
out of C. D. & w. grants-in-aid. Two things are worth noting 
here. First, owing to the financial arrangements of the 
sterling area, as described in Chapter I, West Africa has 
had the privilege of purchasing imports with sterling from 
any country in the area. To the extent, therefore, that 
development imports originated in the sterling area they 
could have been financed out of sterling assets not tied 
up in working balances or special funds. This was the case 
during the entire period since the end of the war and the 
fact that West Africa experienced surpluses or deficits on 
current account was of no consequence for any single year. 
Second, C.D. & w. grants did not imply any special privileges 
for West Africa with respect to excessibility of foreign ex-
change. For, as members of the sterling area, West African 
countries were entitled, at least in principle, to draw 
from the foreign exchange pool. That is to say, there is no 
reason to assume that any drawing from the pool that might 
have resulted from C.D. & W. grants would have been denied 
to West African governments even in the absence of the grants. 
3. British official statements claim that C.D. & W. 
funds constitute a 11 burden 11 upon Britain, that is, that the 
grants result in a net reduction in the availability of goods 
and services to the United Kingdom. This, of course, is the 
result that would ordinarily be expected to follow, in the 
giving country, from a policy of capital allocation in the 
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form of grants-in-aid. Thus, in 1945, the British Secretary 
of State for the Colonies declared: 
The contribution to be made from the Imperial 
Exchequer is a real burden on the United King-
dom taxpayer, to be borne at a time when the 
resources of the United Kingdom, external as 
well as internal have been heavily strained; 
• • • In spite of the manifold difficulties 
confronting the United Kingdom on all sides, 
the additional effort necessary to provide the 
funds set aside under the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act will be gladly made because of 
the desire to see golonial development and wel-
fare advanced. • • 
Again, in 1960, the Chancellor of the Exchequer asserted that, 
11 In so far as this assistance comes from the Exchequer, it is 
a cost to the British people which is borne because of the 
need it meets and the benefit it brings."5 These are categor-
ical statements. It remains to be seen to what extent economic 
analysis supports them. 
A Theoretical Model 
Let us assume the following: (1) there are only four 
countries, the United Kingdom, West Africa, the rest of the 
sterling area, (R.S.A.), and all non-sterling area countries, 
(N.S.A.); (2) West Africa holds sterling balances only to the 
4areat Britain, Colonial Development and Welfare Despatch 
Dated November 12, 1945, Cmd. 6713, London: 1945, p. 3. 
5areat Britain, Assistance from the United Kingdom for 
Overseas Development, Cmnd. 974, London: 1966. 
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extent that they are needed as working balances. 
The United Kingdom Parliament votes to allocate a certain 
sum of money under the C. D. & W. Act for West African develop-
ment programs. This sum is part of the budget and therefore 
must be met out of receipts and, if necessary, by borrowing. 
Grants may be allocated for the purpose of increasing West 
African imports or increasing the purchasing power within 
West Africa. Both possibilities present several considerations 
which have to be examined before it can be determined whether 
the United Kingdom carries the burden of grants-in-aid to 
West Africa or not. 
Assuming that the grants are given in order to increase 
West African imports, the grants are credited in sterling to 
the appropriate West African sterling accounts in London. It 
was pointed out in Chapter I that sterling may be used not 
only to purchase goods from the United Kingdom, but also from 
any member in the sterling area. Sterling is merely trans-
ferred from the account of the importing nation to that of 
the exporting nation. It was also shown that sterling area 
members may use sterling credits to purchase foreign exchange 
from the Exchange Equalization Account. Thus, West Africa may 
use a grant to purchase imports from the United Kingdom, R.S.A. 
or N.S.A. 
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If the entire grant is spent on imports from the United 
Kingdom, the sterling will be transferred from West African 
accounts to United Kingdom accounts and the amount of goods 
and services available to the United Kingdom will be decreased. 
If the grant is spent on imports from R.S.A., sterling will be 
transferred from West African accounts to R.S.A. accounts in 
London. Here several possibilities may arise. R.S.A. may 
leave the new balances in its accounts in London; if so, no 
burden will fall upon the United Kingdom. 6 If R.S.A. spends 
the entire sum on imports from the United Kingdom, the sterling 
will be transferred from R.S.A. accounts into United Kingdom 
accounts. The decrease in the availability of goods and ser-
vices to the United Kingdom stemming from its exports to R.S.A. 
6If the assumption that R.S.A. is a single country were 
modified to allow two or more countries to be represented by 
this classification, the conclusion reached would not be 
essentially different. For it would be possible for two or 
more R.S.A. countries to trade among themselves indefinitely 
with the sterling received from West African grant-in-aid 
expenditures. If Australia, for instance, received the 
entire expenditure from West Africa and then imported goods 
from New Zealand, the grant would first be transferred from 
the West African to the Australian account and then to the 
New Zealand account. The aggregate sterling balances in 
London would remain unchanged, the grant would remain in the 
foreign trade accounts of the sterling area, and the United 
Kingdom would not carry the burden of its grants-in-aid to 
West Africa for an indeterminable period of time. 
will mean that the entire burden o£ the grant has £allen 
upon the United Kingdom. A third possibility is for R.S.A. 
to spend its new sterling assets on imports £rom N.S.A. 
Imports £rom N.S.A. will require £oreign exchange unless 
sterling is accepted as a means of payment. If £oreign ex-
change is required, R.S.A. can buy it from the Exchange 
Equalization Account. Assuming that there is no shortage of 
£oreign exchange in the sterling area, and that R.S.A. im-
ports £rom N.S.A. do not create one, that part o£ the increased 
earnings in N.S.A. that is spent on imports from the United 
Kingdom will represent the extent o£ the burden. If thereis 
a shortage of foreign exchange in the sterling area, R.S.A. 
imports from N.S.A. will place an immediate burden upon the 
United Kingdom by curtailing the latter 1 s ability to purchase 
goods £rom N.S.A. The effect upon the United Kingdom will 
be the same, should N.S.A. fail to expand its imports from 
anywhere as a result of its increased exports. Should N.S.A. 
increase its imports from R.S.A. and should R.S.A. fail to in-
crease its imports from the United Kingdom, no burden would 
fall upon the latter inasmuch as R.S.A. must turn in all its 
foreign exchange earnings to London. N.S.A., however, may 
accept sterling as payment for exports to R.S.A. (or to the 
United Kingdom). This might be the case, for example, if 
88. 
N.S.A. had a continuous surplus with the sterling area and 
wished to enjoy some of the benefits of multilateral trade 
within that area. N.S.A. could then trade with the United 
Kingdom, R.S.A., or even West Africa, without having to con-
vert its currency into local currency. Its position, as far 
as payments are concerned, would then be the same as that of 
any member of the sterling area. Should West Africa import 
from N.S.A., the burden upon the United Kingdom will be de-
termined by the same considerations that would govern the 
expenditure of funds by R.S.A. on imports from N.S.A. 
Grants that are allocated in order to increase purchasing 
power within West Africa, (assuming that West Africa does not 
have the ability to create domestic money, an assumption con-
sistent with colonial status) will be deposited with the 
West African Currency Board. The Board will issue West African 
currency at a ratio of one to one that will be injected into 
the West African economy through the expenditures of the West 
African Government. If West Africa has a high marginal pro-
pensity to import, the extent of the burden falling upon the 
United Kingdom will be determined by the considerations out-
lined above. If the marginal propensity to import in West 
Africa is low, the increased supply of West African currency 
will tend to remain in circulation and the sterling obtained 
through the grant will remain in the West African Currency 
Board's sterling account in London. 
r 
To sum up, it can be said that, if West Africa does not 
possess sterling balances beyond working balances, there are 
three possibilities concerning the burden upon the United 
Kingdom resulting from a grant-in-aid: there may be no burden 
at all; the burden may fall upon Great Britain to an extent 
equal to that of the grant; or it may fall upon that country 
to an extent smaller than the full value of the grant. 
Now let us change the second of the two initial assump-
tions. It will be assumed that West Africa holds sterling 
balances in excess of current requirements and that these 
balances, with the exception of the portion held for working 
balances, sinking funds and pension funds, are available for 
development financing. Sterling balances are accumulated from 
balance of payments surpluses, which may be due to surpluses 
with sterling area countries, non-sterling area countries, or 
both. 
The new assumption gives rise to one major change in the 
conclusions previously reached. If it is presumed that West 
Africa would not have made the same expenditures in the absence 
of grants, the burden of the grants is still determined by the 
considerations presented under the previous assumptions. On 
the other hand if it is Presumed that West Africa would have 
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spent the same amount, the allocation of grants creates no 
burden for the United Kingdom, even though an outflow of 
goods and services occurs. For the goods and services that 
leave the United Kingdom as a result of grant-in-aid expendi-
tures would have left in any event. 
Under the original assumptions it was shown that when-
ever grant expenditures result, directly or indirectly, in 
United Kingdom exports, the burden clearly falls upon the 
United Kingdom. The assumption that West Africa holds excess 
sterling balances raises a doubt as to whether the burden 
falls upon the United Kingdom even if grants cause the latter•s 
exports to rise. 
Some Empirical Considerations 
An attempt has been made to inject such assumptions into 
the model as seem to cover the most pertinent range of theo-
retical possibilities. It is now necessary to examine each 
of the assumptions in the light of the known evidence and 
construct a situation which conforms more closely to these 
facts. 
It was assumed that there were only four countries in 
the world. While this is not a realistic assumption, it is 
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obviously not a severe handicap. It was also assumed that 
C. D. & W. grants-in-aid were part of the annual budgetary 
expenditures of the United Kingdom, but the validity of 
this assumption is not essential to the problem discussed 
here, since the crucial consideration is the effect of West 
African expenditures of grants on the availability of goods 
and services to the United Kingdom. It is interesting to 
note, however, that c. D. & w. grants do, in fact, appear 
8 in the United Kingdom budget and that deficit financing may 
be carried on through the sale of Treasury Bills to colonial 
sterling balance holders. 
It is not known whether grants to West Africa were in-
tended solely to boost imports or whether they were, in part 
at least, also intended to permit an expansion of internal 
purchasing power. As far as the question of a burden upon 
the United Kingdom resulting from grants is concerned, how-
ever, the distinction is not likely to be of any great 
significance, inasmuch as the marginal propensity to import 
in West Africa is generally believed to be high. 9 
Bareat Britain, Statement of Revenue and Expenditure as 
Laid Before the House by the Chancellor of the Exchequer When 
Opening the Budget, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1956, p. 12, p. 14. 
9P.T. Bauer, West African Trade, Cambridge: University 
Press, 1954, pp. 333-34; P. W. Bell, The Sterling Area in 
the Postwar World, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. 
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In Chapter I it was shown that West Africa has held size-
able and, with few exceptions, annually increasing sterling 
balances since 1945. 10 Further, an examination of the form 
in which Nigerian and Ghanaian sterling assets are held show-
ed that a large part of the total might be considered available 
for development financing. 
Another highly important consideration might be the 
direction of expenditures of grants-in-aid to West Africa. 
It is impossible, of course, to determine the origin of each 
pound of expenditure on development in West Africa. Even if 
the projects which are the recipients of C. D. & W. funds are 
known, the expenditures made with these funds cannot be deter-
mined unless the whole project is financed by the grant. 
Therefore, no evidence can be presented concerning the use of 
monies that have been earned in exporting to West Africa by 
R.S.A. and N.S.A. There is also the difficulty of determining 
which imports should be classified as specifically intended 
for development. The available information shows, however, 
that over 50 per cent of West African imports of capital 
goods originate in the United Kingdom. 11 
lOTable 1. 
11Gambia, Trade Report, Sessional Paper No. 3, 1956, 
Bathurst: Government Printer, 1956; Gambia, Trade Report, 
Sessional Paper No. 8, 1958, Bathurst: Government Printer, 1958; 
Ghana, Handbook of Commerce and Industry, Accra: Government 
Printer, 1958; Nigeria, Trade Report, Lagos: Government Printer, 
1954, 1957; Sierra Leone, Trade Report, Freetown: Government 
Printer, 1953, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958. 
93. 
While it is not known what part, if any, of c. D. & w. 
grants to West Africa is spent on imports from non-sterling 
area countries, foreign exchange (other than sterling) might 
pose certain problems which deserve some comment. It has 
been noted that West Africa as a member of the sterling area 
has been obligated to turn in its foreign exchange earnings 
to the Exchange Equalization Account in London; sterling ere~ 
its are received in return which may be held in London ac-
counts, exchanged for West African currency, or spent on im-
ports. It was also pointed out that West Africa has consist-
ently been a net contributor of dollars to the foreign exchange 
pool. Has West Africa sacrificed goods and services because 
of sterling area arrangements? 
If sterling is fully convertible, West Africa does not 
sacrifice its claims on.non-sterling area goods by giving up 
its foreign exchange earnings to the Exchange Account. It can 
draw upon the pool at any time, along with the other members 
of the area, in accordance with its own needs and not with 
the requirements of the whole sterling area. Since 1958, as 
was noted earlier, a high degree of, though not full, convert-
ibility has been present in the sterling area. 
From the end of World War II until 1958, however, convert-
ibility was extremely limited, though not entirely absent, in 
the sterling area, and the West African foreign exchange 
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earnings that were turned over to the Exchange Equalization 
Account represented a potential sacrifice by West Africa of 
claims on goods and services from non-sterling area countries. 
Since dollars were fully convertible during this period, it 
made no difference to West Africa whether imports originated 
outside the sterling area or not. For, even if West Africa 
had not been in possession of sterling it could have used all 
its dollar earnings, had it not been subjected to sterling 
area restrictions, to purchase imports from any other country 
in the world, including sterling zone countries. Here it 
should be noted that it is not known whether West Africa was 
in fact denied requests for foreign exchange during this 
period. Nor can it be said with any degree of certainty that 
West Africa would have used more foreign exchange than it did, 
had a higher degree of convertibility been present from 1945 
to 1958. In any event, it seems probable that during that 
period foreign exchange would not have been available for 
West African development financing in the amount contributed 
by West Africa to the exchange pool. This contention is sup-
ported by the striking fact that West Africa's total contri-
bution of dollars to the exchange pool from 1945 to 1955 was 
£ 224.8 million, while the entire value of its development 
programs was only£ 143.6 million for that same period. 12 
12Table 7 and Table 14. 
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Since these dollars were contributed through the sale of 
West African products, it is clear that West Africa sacri-
ficed claims to foreign exchange earned by it and not merely 
claims contributed by other members of the sterling area. 
Table 14 shows the total dollar contributions to the 
Exchange Equalization Account by West Africa from 1947 to 
1958 and the annual Colonial Development and Welfare grants 
to that area for the same period. It will be noted that 
dollar contributions far exceed grants-in-aid in any single 
year. That is to say, while West Africa has received sterl-
ing resources in the form of grants-in-aid, it has at the 
same time given up foreign exchange resources it might other-
wise have used. It is conceivable that, under these circum-
stances, the sacrifice of goods and services by West Africa 
during this period may have been greater than that of the 
United Kingdom. 
Finally, there is the question of what expenditures West 
Africa would or would not have made in the absence of grants-
in-aid. Of course, there is no evidence available to show 
what course of action West Africa would have taken had the 
grants not been allocated for development programs. Neverthe-
less, it is clear that during the period considered here, West 
Africa did possess the sterling assets needed to make the 
expenditures that were financed through grants. The financing 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
TABLE 14 
DOLLAR CONTRIBUTIONS BY WEST AFRICA AND COLONIAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE GRANTS-IN-AID 
TO WEST AFRICA, 1947-1958 
Dollar 
Contributions 
10.0 
19.8 
16.8 
33.2 
38.2 
33.3 
31.5 
25.3 
16.9 
16.9 
8.0 
15.5 
£ Millions 
C.D. & W. 
Grants 
3.9 
3.3 
3.4 
4.1 
Sources: Great Britain, Statistical Abstract for the 
Commonwealth, London: 1951-1959; Great Britain, Colonial 
Development and Welfare Acts, Cmnd. 612, 1959, p. 11. 
aThis figure is the total of C.D. & W. grants to 
West Africa for the 1946-54 period. 
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or this part or the development programs was not, therefore, 
a limiting factor. Moreover, the decision to draw down on 
sterling balances in the absence of grants could have been 
made independently of considerations regarding current 
account earnings in any given year. For West Africa had 
large sterling balances available for development financing 
which it could have used even if it did not experience a 
surplus in the balance of payments. In other words, develop-
ment plans could have been undertaken on the basis or exist-
ing assets; it would not have been necessary to rely on a 
projection or expected future surpluses. 
Summary and Conclusion 
To sum up, then, this chapter has dealt with three 
questions: (1) whether West Africa required grants-in-aid; 
(2) whether the grants that were allocated to it were effect-
ively transferred; and most importantly, (3) whether the 
United Kingdom shouldered the burden of C. D. & W. grants. 
1. Ordinarily, grants-in-aid are given to those nations 
who do not have the resources to purchase certain imports. 
The implimentation of development programs in underdeveloped 
countries is almost invariably based on certain import re-
quirements. West African countries, however, though under-
developed and engaged in the execution of development programs, 
98. 
have had the necessary resources to meet import requirements 
without the benefit of grants-in-aid. For, since the end of 
World War II, the level of their sterling reserves, accumu-
lated as a result of farily consistent surpluses in the 
balance of payments, has tended to be high. In short, West 
Africa has been a creditor area in which the availability of 
resources has not been a limiting factor for development 
programs. 
2. It follows that the question of effective transfer 
of the grants, as presented by Hazelwood, is not particularly 
relevant to a discussion of West African development financ-
ing, although the fact that they were ineffectively trans-
ferred throughout most of the period considered here, that is, 
since World War II, adds weight to the argument that they were 
not absolutely essential for the execution of development 
programs. 
3. Categorical statements by British officials to the 
effect that the burden of c. D. & W. grants-in-aid has fallen 
upon the United Kingdom do not appear to be correct. The 
burden may have fallen upon the United Kingdom, but this is a 
mere possibility. For, as has been shown, the possession of 
excess sterling balances by West Africa suggests that grants-
in-aid may have been used to purchase goods that would other-
wise have been purchased with sterling balances. It is there-
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fore possible that British grants-in-aid neither benefited 
West Africa nor placed a burden upon the United Kingdom. 
It has also been shown that, even if West Africa had not 
possessed excess sterling balances, British grants would not 
necessarily have created a burden for the United Kingdom, 
though they would have benefited West Africa. That such a 
situation is conceivable is due to West Africa's membership 
in the sterling area, as described in the first chapter. 
In view of these considerations, the proposition that a 
substantive change in British policy toward economic develop-
ment of its dependencies, or former dependencies, particularly 
in West Africa, can be doubted. 
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A:SST~1AC~r 
In 1-·ecen..._ "'re"~>c: n.!'\''lbl. a G'n"'"'a ..._he Gola1 Co··· "t •~ , v •...:' (:~.!.. ;_) ",--\c;_...._, C ' ...t (":'_J.J. ' t_., , I ;r j :_::, ;._j ' and 
Sier'::R Leone have been engarcd in ··ublic investl:tent -~Jro-
f"J~nn:c: to ·c·ror,ote economic devcloiJment. These ";Jest African 
count~ies 2re all r:·art of the ste:c-•ling arec_. The develop-
r1ent (.lrogr2mf~ have been financed fror:1 var:~ ous sou.rces, 
including United :;:-~ingdom g:r'o.nts-in-aid. Certain official 
B1•i tish stater.1ents claim categorically that the b·,rden of 
these t:rr-mts falls 'J::-)on the United J:"ingdom. h1lile it is 
true thr::t the g:eants are given by the British it is not 
clear that the United Kj_ngdom shoulders the burden. 
~·Jest A:C'rica has experienced surpluses in its bal2.nce 
of payments on current account in nearly ever;;r year since 
1911-5. Oi-ving to the insti ttl tionr.l gr:r'anr:r,e:Tlents of the 
sterling area these S'>.r~lluses are held :tn London accounts, 
j_n f~terling (t~e fo::_~m in 'Hhich grants are given), and, 
therefore, West Africa has been a cru1ital e~·o~ter. ~est 
African r·terling balances h8.Ve been m?.ny tir1es the size of 
the grants ',.rhich T.Jest Africa ha,c: received .from the United 
Kingdom. rr:oreover, sterline: 2.rea ar,reements concerning 
trade anong the mer;1bers indicate that it is - ossible, at 
least in theory, for ~rants to ~est Africa to result in 
no decrease in the availability of roods and services to 
the united Fine;dom. 
2. 
The problem is important, j_n vie-vr of recent chane~es in 
United Kingdom economic ,-: olicy tm,rard its de·nendencies. Be-
fore '.·Jorld ~·!rr II, the 1Jnited Kingdom in its policy state-
ments declared that colonial development should be on a pay-
as-you-go basis and though some loans snd grants ':·rere !nade, 
on the whole, no S'Ibstantial noney ·Har> given in this form. 
~IO"·:ever, there o_;:;::; eared to be a E:ignificant change in this 
as·- ect of :Jri tic:·h :oolicy ui th tho lJassing of the Colonial 
Development and ':lolfare Act of 19L~O. 'l'l'1at is, the alloca-
t5.on from United ;r.incdo-v1 resources of lj.1xro.l r-:-~'.:;t~-:i_n-
.<•::ce[ o c·f -r:-,_3.t t'·te individual colonies -:rere able to <lffo·.."d 
out of their o·:m :c'esou:eces. Jc~oreover, ~, olicy decla~:-ations 
accor:n o.nying the 191+0 and Sl'bseci"Ltent n.cts s t:l_ ted S 7 ' ec:ti'ically 
that the cha,>ge had been ma.de. An ar:.alysis of th_e 0>1estion 
of ~-rhether o::c• not the r:::rants re11resent a b1rden upon the 
United 1\inrrdom ma;r shed some light on the extr::nt of the 
chanr;e in "1ritifr~ nolic;r; that is, uhcther the change ·o-ras 
also E"c'bstaYJtive o:r' nleT·ely :form'"'ll. 
This thesis is confronted b:t two major limitat~_ons. 
First, the lack of statistical infornation. For instn:nce, 
fip.1res for br~_lc.nce of' ·c: aymsnts on c ;.rrent account are not 
o.v~dlable before 19c::o in the cases of Ghana and ~:igeria and 
h2.ve not been com-uted at all :'or Gar'lbia and 2,ierra Leone; 
full balr:mce of i-:;~1~rments data are only G.vail8ble :for Ghana 
after 1952. Second, tb.ere is a lack of 11nifor:rn statistics 
in some cases. Ghana's statistics for the years just pre-
ceding its independence do not always agree Hith the in-
formation published by the British Colonial Office. 
The ':'Uestion of whether or not United Kingdom grants-
in-aid to West Africa have been a b•1rden u.pon the United 
YJ.ngdom centers around the 'JOsi tion of :'lest Africa as a 
capital exporter and the nature of the grants themselves, 
their origin and use. The analysis, therefore, must be 
preceded by a discussion of certain asnects of vlest Africa 
in relat:ton to the sterling area and as the recinient of 
Colonial Develonment and \•lelfare grant s-in-aid. 
Ganbia, :')ierra Leone, Ghana and Hip:eria have, as a 
group, consistently been the largest holders of colonial 
") 
..Je 
sterling balances since 191, . .5. As colonies, these countries 
have had neither the rip;ht to determine their m-rn inter-
national monetary policies nor the or)tion to Hi thdraw from 
the area. Usin[: the 19.59 Nip:erian situation ns a ro.:uide it 
can be said that a-r--:oroxima tely L!_O • .5 n er cent of the total 
sterling balances is not available for development financing. 
}:l'urthermore, OHing to s,pecial arrangonents 1>Ji thin the ster-
ling area, all gold and foreign exchange earned in inter-
national trade must be turned in to the E:xchange Equalization 
Account by member nations. From the end of \cJorld '','ar II to 
1956, the colonies, Ceylon, and the Union of South Africa 
were the only net contributors to the exchange pool. For 
4. 
the colonies tl1.e ·: ooling of foreign exchange Has entirely 
involuntary and the nt?,jori ty of the ~\fest African co11.ntries' 
exchanr;e earnings \-Jere in the form of scarce dollax·s. 
Foreign exchange is a central consideration for a poor 
country. Development req·uires, among other things, the 
irrmortation of capital. For nany underdeveloped countries 
foreign exchange is difficult to come by, since they do not 
earn enough to sunnly their imnort needs. Por 'tlest Africa, 
ho•,Jever, the situation is different; here is an area that 
earns a lE\rge amount of foreign exchange in the ~r,rorld r:1arketE:, 
but Hhich must gear its use of foreign exchange in general to 
an ay:'J_ount 1:-hich is in harr:1.ony Hi th the needs of the other 
mernberr of the sterling area. 
At the srune time capital flov.rs from tho United Iungdom 
to ~.Jest Africa, in the form of Colonial Development and ·~vel­
fare p;rants, have occured annaally. In light of the simul-
taneous existence of these t"t-ro flows (foreign exchange from 
\'Jest Africa to London and grants-in-a~ d from London to :-lest 
Africa) and the fact that the former has exceededthe latter 
in size, it may be asl--\:ed whether t~e C.D. & \rJ. Acts have, 
5.n f~:.ct constituted a substantive change in United J(ingdom 
--~olicy or t-:hether Hest Africa has contj_nued to finance its 
development out of -vrha t is, in reality, its oHn financial 
resources. 
5. 
Categorical ~:;tatem.ents by !3ri tish officials to the 
effect t~-m t the b 1:rden of C. D. f.: iti. 0rants-i n-aid has fallen 
unon the United Kingdom do not anpear to be correct. T'ne 
b'1rden may have fallen 1.xpon the United Ieinc;dom, but this 
is a mere possibility. For, as is shown in the text, the 
':-:ossession of e;:::cess sterling balances by \fest Africa sug-
rests that grants-in-nid may have been used to purchase 
goods that would othervdse have been purchased t.ri th sterling 
balances. Itis therefore possible that British ~rants-in­
aid neither benefited West Africa nor nlaced a burden upon 
the United Kingdom. It is also shmv-n that, even if ~de st 
Africa has not -r,ossessed excess sterlinr balances, Bri t::i_sh 
grants would not necessarily have created a ~trden for the 
United Kingdom, though they 'lrJould have benefited \·Jest Africa. 
That ::''1.ch a situation is conceivable is due to \~est Africa's 
membership in the sterling area, as described in the first 
chaDter. 
In vieH of these ccnsidera tions, the r:roposi tion that 
a substantive change in British ,- olicy toHard economic de-
velonment of its dependencies, or former dependenc:ie s, 
particnlarly in \-Jest Africa, can be doubted. 
